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ABSTRACT—The model of discrimination animating some of the most
common approaches to detecting discrimination in both law and social
science—the counterfactual causal model—is wrong. In that model, racial
discrimination is detected by measuring the “treatment effect of race,” where
the treatment is conceptualized as manipulating the raced status of otherwise
identical units (e.g., a person, a neighborhood, a school). Most objections to
talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual model have been raised in
terms of manipulability. If we cannot manipulate a person’s race at the
moment of a police stop, traffic encounter, or prosecutorial charging
decision, then it is impossible to detect if the person’s race was the sole cause
of an unfavorable outcome. But this debate has proceeded on the wrong
terms. The counterfactual causal model of discrimination is not wrong
because we can’t work around the practical limits of manipulation, as
evidenced by both Eddie Murphy’s comic genius in the Saturday Night Live
skit “White Like Me” and the entire genre of audit and correspondence
studies. It is wrong because to fit the rigor of the counterfactual model of a
clearly defined treatment on otherwise identical units, we must reduce race
to only the signs of the category, meaning we must think race is skin color,
or phenotype, or other ways we identify group status. And that is a concept
mistake if one subscribes to a constructivist, as opposed to a biological or
genetic, conception of race. The counterfactual causal model of
discrimination is based on a flawed theory of what the category of race
references, how it produces effects in the world, and what is meant when we
say it is wrong to make decisions of import because of race. I argue that
DISCRIMINATION is a thick ethical concept that at once describes and
evaluates the actions to which it is applied, and therefore, we cannot detect
actions as discriminatory by identifying a relation of counterfactual
causality; we can do so only by reasoning about the action’s distinctive
wrongfulness by referencing what constitutes the very categories that are the
objects of concern. An adequate theory of discrimination must rest upon (1)
an account of the system of social meanings or practices that constitute the

1163

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

categories at issue and (2) a moral theory of what is fair and just in various
state and private arenas given what the categories are.
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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING AND DETECTING DISCRIMINATION
Judge Schroeder did not believe Dr. Lamberth could pick out Hispanic
drivers by looking at them. 1
To be more specific, Judge Schroeder did not find the method Dr.
Lamberth employed to create a “benchmark” of the objective rate at which
Hispanic drivers violated traffic laws in North Carolina’s Alamance County
to be scientific.
To be even more specific, Judge Schroeder did not believe that Dr.
Lamberth had deployed an objective, replicable, or verifiable method to
detect the rate at which Hispanic drivers violated North Carolina traffic laws
by hiring two auditors, Mr. Rivera and Mr. Valdez, to sit in parked cars on
select roadways, observe passing cars, count which were violating North
Carolina traffic laws, and look at drivers to see “who ‘appeared to be’ or
‘looked’ Hispanic.” 2
Judge Schroeder noted that other cases and other peer-reviewed studies
relied upon a similar observational methodology to construct a benchmark
of the rate at which a designated demographic group violated certain laws.
However, he pointed out that those studies “utilized more reliable methods
of observation,” and were comparing “African-American drivers, not
Hispanic drivers, to non-African-American drivers,” which, his reasoning
implied, presented obvious and unproblematic indicia of racial status. 3 Judge
Schroeder concluded that because “no control, standard, or description was
used to identify Hispanics[,] . . . Dr. Lamberth offered no information on
what, if any, standard [the auditors] used,” and “Dr. Lamberth’s study thus
relies entirely on the subjective views of Rivera and Valdez and their

1 United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 331 (M.D.N.C. 2015). Debates about the visual
obviousness of racial and ethnic categories is a longstanding tradition in American law. See, for example,
the fascinating discussion of the racial status of Hindus in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S.
204 (1923), in Sherally Munshi, “You Will See My Family Became So American”: Toward a Minor
Comparativism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 655, 656 (2015), or the discussion of the adjudication of the
obviousness of Alice Jones’s blackness in Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 2393, 2399 (2007).
2 Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 305.
3 Id. at 332.
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personal, totally subjective say-so of who should be considered ‘Hispanic.’”4
Judge Schroeder, therefore, excluded Dr. Lamberth’s expert report and
testimony as failing to meet the Daubert standards for admissibility,
including testability, known error rates, peer review, and general acceptance
in the scientific community. 5
Based on his conclusion that this and another study could not prove
discrimination, Judge Schroeder ruled in 2015 that the United States
Department of Justice failed in its more-than-three-year effort to show that
the Alamance County Sheriff engaged in “a pattern or practice of
discriminatory law enforcement activities directed against Latinos in
Alamance County” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 6
How do we know when a particular act, practice, or policy is an instance
of DISCRIMINATION? 7 What precisely do we mean when we identify
discrimination as an act, practice, or policy taken “because of” race or
ethnicity? This Article will probe these questions in one arena of social life
in which this author just happens to have experience and interest—police and
prosecutorial racial discrimination. The conceptual analysis offered here is
applicable to other arenas of social life—from employment, to housing, to
credit—and has modified implications for how to conceptualize other
categories of discrimination—from sex to sexual orientation. However, I will
stick to the example of race or ethnicity in criminal justice simply to focus
the discussion and because these debates have immediate political salience
as recent killings of unarmed black persons have pushed the question of
4

Id. at 331.
This is the court’s “gatekeeping” function under FED. R. EVID. 702, and Daubert requires “that any
and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
6 Complaint at 1, Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272 (No. 1:12-cv-01349-TDS-JLW); see also Johnson,
122 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (concluding that the United States Department of Justice did not meet its burden
of demonstrating that the Alamance County Sherriff’s Office engaged in discriminatory law enforcement
practices).
In 2012, the Department of Justice had filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, alleging that the Alamance
County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO), headed by Terry S. Johnson,
5

disproportionately subjects Hispanics to unreasonable searches, arrests them for minor infractions
(in lieu of issuing warnings or citations), targets them at vehicle checkpoints located in
predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods, uses ethically-offensive epithets to refer to Hispanics and
otherwise tolerates activities of deputies that evidence anti-Hispanic bias, automatically and
selectively refers Hispanic arrestees to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
investigators for deportation, and otherwise engages in deficient policies, training, and oversight
that facilitates discriminatory enforcement.
Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 282.
7 I use small caps for concepts (the concept DISCRIMINATION in noun form or DISCRIMINATORY in
adjectival form); scare quotes for terms of art, expressions, or to indicate so-called usage; and italics for
emphasis.
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discriminatory police violence into mainstream public debates. So how do
we detect discrimination when questions of great importance hang in the
balance?
A. Discrimination as Outcomes Caused by Race
This Article argues that animating the most common approaches to
detecting discrimination in both law and social science is a model of
discrimination that is, well, wrong. I term this model the “counterfactual
causal model” of race discrimination. Discrimination, on this account, is
detected by measuring the “treatment effect of race,” where treatment is
conceptualized as manipulating the raced status of otherwise identical units
(e.g., a person, a neighborhood, a school). 8 Discrimination is present when
an adverse outcome occurs in the world in which a unit is “treated” by being
raced—for example, black—and not in the world in which the otherwise
identical unit is “treated” by being, for example, raced white. 9 The
counterfactual model has the allure of precision and the security of
seemingly obvious divisions or natural facts. 10 Despite notable objections,
8 I will use the awkward terminology of “unit” throughout the Article, unless I am giving an example
of particular types of units, in order to indicate that the model (and my objections to it) can encompass
individual and aggregate units of analysis. The treatment would differ based on the type of unit. For
example, we might imagine the individual-level treatment to be discrete raced status (e.g., white vs.
black), and the treatment for aggregate-level units might be a continuous measurement (e.g., population
composition measure). Although there are important differences between individual-level and aggregatelevel units in terms of expressing the counterfactual model and the types of objections one could raise to
the model as a conceptualization of discrimination, this Article is mostly dedicated to laying out the broad
strokes of my objections.
9 Levi Martin and King-To Yeung launch their exploration of the use of the category of race in
sociology over sixty years with the following parable:

There is an old Zen koan in which the master Shuzan Osho held up his staff before his disciples
and said, “You monks! If you call this a staff, you oppose its reality. If you do not call it a staff,
you ignore the fact. Tell me, you monks, what will you call it?” The discomfort felt by the monks,
who had to choose between denying their insight into the fundamental oneness of the universe
and making the absurd counterfactual denial of self-evident fact, is also felt by many sociologists
when it comes to the analysis of race.
John Levi Martin & King-To Yeung, The Use of the Conceptual Category of Race in American Sociology,
1937–99, 18 SOC. F. 521, 521 (2003). In a rare moment of commonality with monks, I am similarly
tortured to find terminology that at once acknowledges the socially constructed nature of race but also
recognizes that in its current constructed form, it presents as a solid, obvious, and commonsensical
“category of practice.” Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y
1, 4 (2000). Like the monks, I have not found an answer to how to acknowledge the taken-for-granted
status of race and also its contingent, constructed, and contested meaning and content. So, I will waver
back and forth, probably frustrating everyone with my terminology, sometimes using race
unproblematically when I am talking about the counterfactual model, and sometimes using awkward
terms like “raced status” to indicate a black box of ascriptive meaning.
10 Osagie Obasogie calls the current hegemonic understanding “race” ipsa loquitur: “[the] notion
that race is not only visually obvious but that its social salience, perceptibility, and visual significance

1167

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

this remains the leading conception of discrimination in both law and social
science. 11 But I contend that this model is wrong. It is wrong because it is
based on a flawed theory of (1) what the concept RACE references and how
it produces effects in the world, and (2) what we mean when we say it is bad
to make important decisions “because of race.”
Much of this Article is dedicated to making the negative case against
the predominant counterfactual causal model of discrimination by arguing
that it is incompatible with the constructivist theory of race, to which most
(but not all) academics and judges say they subscribe. 12 In the process, I
propose a radically different way of conceptualizing discrimination that uses
two concepts largely unfamiliar in debates about discrimination. Although
these concepts might at first blush seem challenging, I contend that they are
essential to any plausible approach to discrimination.
Objections to talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual
framework are usually raised in terms of manipulability. Candidates for
causes in the counterfactual framework are limited to viable treatments to
which a unit could be subjected at the time the outcome of interest might
occur. 13 If one cannot manipulate a person’s race at the moment of a police
stop, traffic encounter, or prosecutorial charging decision, then it is
impossible to detect if the person’s race was the sole cause of an unfavorable
outcome. But, as many have pointed out, we should not confuse empirical
and theoretical objections. If one accepts that race or ethnicity is the type of
thing that is properly conceptualized as an isolated manipulation on units that
can otherwise remain the same units, then there are workarounds to the
practical problems of actual manipulation. We can, for example, imagine
presenting a police officer or prosecutorial decision-maker with candidates
for an outcome bearing identical credentials and vary some indicia of the
candidate’s racial status in order to detect the treatment effect of race. This
is the logic of what are called audit studies––a method illustrated brilliantly
stem from self-evident distinctions . . . .” OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE
THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND 143–44 (2014).
11 See infra Parts I–II.
12 And if one is not a constructivist about race, then I don’t see any way one can recognize
discrimination as a wrong distinctive from, say, general distributive injustice or inefficiency. See infra
text accompanying notes 16–20.
13 Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 959 (1986).
An attribute cannot be a cause in an experiment, because the notion of potential exposability does
not apply to it. The only way for an attribute to change its value is for the unit to change in some
way and no longer be the same unit. Statements of ‘causation’ that involve attributes as ‘causes’
are always statements of association between the values of an attribute and a response variable
across the units in a population.
Id. at 955.
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by Eddie Murphy in the 1984 Saturday Night Live skit “White Like Me,”
where he applies white face makeup to see how he is treated as a white man
in New York City. 14 But my concerns with conceptualizing race as a
treatment as a way to define discrimination are theoretical, not practical.
The problem with identifying discrimination with the treatment effect
of race is that it misrepresents what race is and how it produces effects in the
world, and concomitantly, what makes discrimination because of race a
moral wrong. In the classic counterfactual causal inference framework, race
can be a treatment on units only if manipulating it does not entail
fundamental changes to other aspects of the unit. Thus, audit studies can be
interpreted as detecting the treatment effect of race and race alone by
changing some signifier of racial status on candidates only if the
manipulation does not transform the unit into a different unit in ways
necessarily relevant to interpreting an action as discriminatory. 15 But if the
signifiers of racial categories fundamentally structure the interpretation and
relevance of other characteristics or traits of the unit, then it is a mistake to
talk about identical units that differ only by raced status. Yet, to talk about
race as an isolated treatment on units reduces it to some set of signifiers that
elicits outcomes in the world only as a psychological trigger or stimulus to
disfavor. And to do so is a gross category mistake, at least if you subscribe
to the constructivist theory of race.
A constructivist rejects the notion that racial categories in the United
States are constituted by genetic or biological facts, and instead holds that
what now seem like obvious, taken-for-granted categories of racial
difference were constructed over hundreds of years of historical practices
starting with chattel slavery and colonization. Categories such as
“whiteness” and “blackness” were forged through social relations such as
forced labor, colonization, immigration, and Jim Crow; they were contested
and policed through many institutions including immigration laws, housing
and education segregation, violent regulation of social and intimate relations,
and hoarding of occupational and economic opportunity. These processes

14 The skit’s name was a play on the book by John Howard Griffin, a white journalist who took
medication to darken his skin and recorded his experiences traveling in the 1950s Deep South. JOHN
HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (2010).
15 “Signifier” and “signified” are terms from semiotics with contested meanings, but for purposes of
this project a simple definition is sufficient. Without subscribing to all of Barthes’s semiotics, I will use
those classic terms—signifier and signified—to roughly mean the forms, signals, and material of
expression (the signifier) and the content expressed, concept referenced, or meaning imparted by the
former (the signified). Signifiers come to signify particular concepts or values because of social, cultural,
or historical convention, not because of some natural relationship between the form of the signifier and
its signified. ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 39–42 (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans.,
1977).

1169

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

made certain aspects of physical appearance salient markers of social
difference and reinforced their relevance over many types of interactions.
Just because we can trace the historical processes by which these categories
were constructed does not make them any less real with real effects; a wink
or hoodie can have fatal consequences because of the status of race. We
continue to live in a world in which most important institutions are
racialized, meaning they play an active role in reproducing the significance
of these very categories.
This—with extreme brevity—is what is commonly termed the social
constructivist theory of race, which holds that the racial categories as we
currently know them are not inevitable distinctions that naturally arise from
objective biological differences, but instead are the product of contingent
historical social processes. 16 Thus, for a constructivist, the term “race” cannot
refer to an attribute, a genetically produced trait, or a signifier—level of
melanin in skin, phenotype, distinctive names or speech—that people just
have and thereby obviously belong to a designated racial group. The term
references a complexly constituted social fact, whereby material and
dignitary opportunities are organized such that certain physical and cultural
signifiers become the salient markers of consequential cultural categories,
and those categories are constituted by a constellation of social relations and
meanings with a definite content and organization. 17 Race in America is, as
Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi say, “a social system that uses skin color as the
criterion for classification. . . . Racial stratification is real, but biology is not
its root cause.” 18 Although the constructivist view is now widely accepted in

16 There are numerous rich (and in some respects competing) frameworks that theorize the processes
by which racial status or groups are constructed. Constructivist positions are articulated in so many places
it is hard to cite to them, but a few well-known examples in sociology include the following: MUSTAFA
EMIRBAYER & MATTHEW DESMOND, THE RACIAL ORDER 49 (2015); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 103–36 (3d ed. 2015); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The
Essential Social Fact of Race, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 899, 899 (1999); and Mara Loveman, Is “Race”
Essential?, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 891, 891 (1999).
17 The term “social fact” is drawn from Durkheim, for whom social facts “consist of manners of
acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue
of which they exercise control over him.” EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD
AND SELECTED TEXTS ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS METHOD 21 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D. Halls trans., 2d ed.
2013). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva described race as “the essential social fact,” and I follow him in saying that
defining race as an individual-level trait makes no sense because it fails to recognize that those traits only
have meaning in particular racialized systems of material and symbolic hierarchies. See Bonilla-Silva,
supra note 16, at 899.
18 Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Methods,
in WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS: RACISM AND METHODOLOGY 3, 10 (Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008).

1170

113:1163 (2019)

Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking

academic circles, its implications are not appreciated by the predominant
legal and social scientific approaches for detecting discrimination.19
One implication of the social constructivist theory is that race cannot be
conceptualized as an isolated treatment in the counterfactual causal model,
and accordingly, racial discrimination cannot be defined as the treatment
effect of race. If we accept the constructivist theory of race, then we must
reject attempts to detect racial discrimination that seek to isolate the causal
effect of race alone because it rests on a sociologically incoherent conception
of what race references and how it can cause a distinctive form of action
called discrimination.
The first conceptual tool I use to proffer an alternative account of
discrimination that is compatible with the constructivist theory of race is
borrowed from moral philosopher Bernard Williams, who coined the phrase
“thick ethical concept” for terms that simultaneously describe and evaluate
the object to which they are applied. 20 Thin ethical concepts, such as BAD,
OUGHT, or RIGHT, do not require “institutional and cultural presuppositions”
in order to impart judgment. 21 To apply the terms properly, you do not need
access to complex social facts, and to say that an action is BAD or RIGHT does
not convey more information about the evaluated action beyond the moral
valuation. Thick ethical concepts, on the other hand, such as
RESPECTABILITY, CHIVALRY, or PIETY, do require complex social
knowledge in order to be used and decoded. To invoke the term is to
simultaneously represent the evaluated action as a particular kind of action—
one that is only classifiable as such using a cultural repertoire and
understandings about the functioning of a particular social world—and to
impart judgment. That is, to morally evaluate an action with a thick ethical
concept communicates information about the way in which the action is bad
that relies on institutional and cultural facts. 22
Discrimination is not a thin ethical concept that can be represented as
“choosing + bad,” “arresting + mean,” or “prosecuting + irrational,” because

19 ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF RACE: HOW SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT HUMAN
DIFFERENCE 10–23 (2011) (showing that the constructivist view is widely accepted among social
scientists, but the biological conception of race is still commonly held by undergraduates and the public
at large); see also Martin & Yeung, supra note 9, at 521–25 (showing that although the constructivist
position is explicitly embraced by social scientists, many fail to operationalize it in any meaningful way
in their research methodology).
20 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 155–56 (2006).
21 Gabriel Abend, Thick Concepts and the Moral Brain, 52 EUR. J. SOC. 143, 147–48 (2011). One
might need situated sociological knowledge to understand the subject of a sentence using thin moral
concepts, such as “Polygamy is bad,” but the evaluative component is not entailed in the way in which
the object is described.
22 Id. at 149–58.
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we know that the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, Title IX, and countless
other state and federal statutes are not about outlawing all bad, mean, or
irrational forms of state or private action. Discrimination is a thick ethical
concept that can only be comprehended with access to situated cultural
knowledge about the relevant categories that make up a particular society’s
system of stratification and a normative critique of how those categories
operate. In order for something to be discriminatory—instead of merely
mean, random, or irrational—the act or policy must rely on meanings or facts
that constitute the social category in ways that we morally disavow.
Therefore, any discrimination-detecting exercise must proceed from some
moral theory—often implicit—of what is fair or just in the face of how a
particular society’s stratification works through meanings and relations of its
social types.
This brings me to the second conceptual tool I use to build an alternative
to the counterfactual causal model of discrimination, that of constitutive
explanation, which I argue accurately captures the type of claim made when
something is labeled discriminatory. A constitutive claim accounts for the
capacities of complex systems by reference to their constitutive elements:
the parts and organization that make the system what it is. 23 To identify
something as discrimination when it happened “because of” race or ethnicity
is not to name a relation of counterfactual dependence defined as an outcome
triggered by isolating and manipulating an individual trait. To identify
something as discrimination when it happened because of race or ethnicity
is to offer a constitutive claim that explains how an action or practice can be
morally objectionable by virtue of the complex of social meanings and
relations that constitute the social category. A constitutive claim unifies a set
of disparate practices (choosing, excluding, promoting, demoting, arresting,
jailing, beating, humiliating, killing) as morally problematic in the same way,
namely by reference to how the action or policy engages the content of the
socially constructed category.
Combining these two conceptual components yields a definition of
discrimination as an action or practice that acts on or reproduces an aspect
of the category in a way that is morally objectionable. It is a thick ethical
concept that—to express the distinctive wrongfulness of the action vis-à-vis
the category—must rest upon an account of the system of social meanings
or practices that constitute the categories at issue.
The definition contains empirical and normative elements, both of
which are black-boxed in this Article. The first black box must contain social
ontology or practical anthropology, requiring us to identify and define the
23
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stratifying social types in a given society; the second black box must contain
political and moral philosophy, requiring us to decide what is fair and just in
various state and private arenas given what the categories are. The point of
this Article is not to fill in those black boxes, but to explain why both
elements are fundamental to any discrimination-detecting endeavor.
B. What to Expect and Why It Matters
Before proceeding, let me be clear that my aim here is not to criticize
quantitative methods, audit studies, or legal strategy from any case or
research program. My aim is to make a set of sociological and analytic points
concerning the meaning of those studies. 24 My conceptual points lead to
political–strategic ones. At the risk of being disowned by my materialist
intellectual family, I will say that ideas matter. They especially matter in the
legal field, where the way in which powerful legal actors conceptualize an
issue has profound implications for what they do with their power.
Currently, many courts, experts, and commentators approach detecting
discrimination as an exercise measuring the counterfactual causal effect of
race-qua-treatment, looking for complex methods to strip away confounding
variables to get at a solid state of race and race alone. 25 But what we are
arguing about when we argue about whether or not statistical evidence
provides proof of discrimination is precisely what we mean by the concept
DISCRIMINATION. We are arguing about the social meaning of race and how
it structures outcomes of interest. Similarly, what we are arguing about when
we debate what variables ought to be controlled for or balanced on in a
quantitative exercise to detect discrimination is what are the fair or just
grounds for decision-making or resource allocation in light of what race is
and how it operates. We ought to be clear about the nature of the debates we
are having such that the driving issues are not obfuscated by claims of
methodological rigor or objective scientism.
Because thick ethical concepts and constitutive explanations are
significantly less familiar ways of approaching discrimination than the
counterfactual causal model, Part I offers a primer so that the reader may
sense that there is an alternative way of thinking about this issue before I
proceed to my negative case. Part II turns, briefly, to showing just how
prevalent the counterfactual causal conceptualization is in both law and
24

Many people who use the terminology of causal effects of race or who interpret methods in a way
that suggests race can be conceptualized as a treatment in the counterfactual model may embrace the
constructivist account of race but use the language because it is expedient. I simply caution that “[w]hat
we do may be more important than what we think and what we say.” Martin & Yeung, supra note 9, at
539.
25 See infra Part II.
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social science. To fully comprehend my critique of the model, it is essential
to present it with formal rigor, and Part III does so. The first two Sections of
Part III explore critiques of talking about race as a treatment in the
counterfactual causal inference literature and lay out the most widely
accepted retort that has been offered to support the counterfactual causal
model of discrimination. The third Section of Part III fleshes out my
sociological objection to race-qua-treatment by exploring how attempting to
isolate the treatment effect of race is at odds with a constructivist account of
race, which rejects the view that racial categories “reflect natural, stable
differences between human groups.” 26
My arguments are pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction in Parts I
through III, and therefore, Part IV explores the cash value of these theoretical
points by thinking through the nitty-gritty of design and interpretation of
audit or correspondence studies, which are usually touted as the gold
standard for causal inference. In this Part, I argue that audit studies certainly
can produce evidence of discrimination, but they don’t do so by virtue of
isolating the treatment effect of race. Audit studies are often recognized as
compelling evidence of discrimination because they instantiate widely
shared moral convictions, namely that, at a minimum, persons in the
designated social groups with the given set of credentials ought to elicit the
same treatment. But, properly understood, audit studies produce evidence of
discrimination in the same way that analysis of observational data or an
individual encounter do: by relying on a constitutive claim about what race
is to ground a moral claim about what is distinctively wrong about the act or
practice.
The final Part of this Article does not offer a new set of clean,
determinate doctrinal formulations of discrimination, nor list magic-bullet
methods to detect it. As will become clear, one of my main claims throughout
this Article is that it is impossible to do so without a prior moral–political
philosophy of what justice requires in private and public domains in light of
what racial and ethnic stratification is in America today, a substantial project
for a different paper (or book). 27 However, I suggest that an upshot of the
arguments I advance about the counterfactual causal model is that
distinctions between disparate treatment and impact that have been advanced
in terms of the former being caused exclusively by race and the latter being
26

MORNING, supra note 19, at 18.
For such eloquent theories and debates, see CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE COLOR OF OUR SHAME:
RACE AND JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (2013); Tommie Shelby, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian
Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697 (2004); Charles W. Mills, Retrieving Rawls for Racial
Justice?: A Critique of Tommie Shelby, 1 CRITICAL PHIL. RACE 1 (2013); and CHARLES W. MILLS,
BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL LIBERALISM (2017).
27
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caused by something that is not-race, but correlated with race, are not
conceptually tenable distinctions. 28 They are not tenable because these
formulations only make sense if one defines race as the visual or social cues
associated with the category: race is skin color, or is phenotype, or is one of
the physical or social signifiers of the category. If one subscribes to the
constructivist notion of race—in which signifiers come to be indicative of a
status only through entrenched social practices—then it is nonsensical to talk
about constitutive practices as somehow being race-neutral things. Of
course, we can advance other distinctions between what should or should not
be legally actionable discrimination, but we can’t do so by relying on valuefree notions of counterfactual causality.
Many scholars have compellingly argued that the law of equal
protection ought to be interpreted as a principle of antisubordination, or that
the purpose of antidiscrimination law more broadly ought to be understood
as a project of remaking social meanings of historically marginalized
groups. 29 I agree with their arguments. But I approach this debate from a new
angle, backing out a theory of the category of race from the prevailing
methods used to detect discrimination. I conclude that if one subscribes to
the constructivist theory of the category of race, then it is incoherent to
understand the legal proscription against discrimination as anything but a
project to remake the very meanings of social categories (unless you don’t
want to distinguish discrimination from mere irrationality or idiosyncrasy,
but then you have a different problem—which is to explain why the state’s
heavy coercive machinery should be concerned with some forms of
classification and not others). 30
Insofar as we (and I use the first-person plural pronoun to indicate I
understand this Article as a part of conversation with activists on this front)
are interested in transforming the social structures that systematically
28 The same conceptual points could be used to query the distinction between what economists call
taste-based and statistical discrimination. The classic distinction defines the former as a willingness to
pay to associate with members of group A instead of B notwithstanding identical productive
qualifications, and the latter as using membership in A or B as a proxy for other instrumentally rational
capacities or qualifications. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOME MODELS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE
LABOR MARKET (1971); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 13–18 (2d ed. 1971);
Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659–61 (1972).
My point is that the former is an instance of DISCRIMINATION only when social conditions—some
systematic social and economic differences that produce the salience of A-ness in opposition to B-ness—
make the latter possible, systematic social and economic differences such that A-ness is available as a
proxy for functionally relevant qualifications.
29 See infra Conclusion.
30 Some have argued that, as a descriptive matter, much of antidiscrimination law has devolved into
merely a proscription against irrationality. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000). My point is to critique such conflation
from basic logical, sociological, and philosophical principles.
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oppress and disadvantage minority communities, we must be incredibly
attentive to the way discourses about race and ethnicity circulate and settle
in the halls of power. In presenting quantitative evidence to courts, it is a
mistake to talk as if we have gotten at the true effect of race by modeling it
as a counterfactual treatment. In fact, to do so cements an already
predominant and problematic understanding about race in public and legal
discourse: one that is distressingly dehistoricized and desocialized.31
Discourses have effects. Folks in positions of power—namely judges
considering discrimination cases—make important decisions because they
understand words and concepts in a particular way. And we should train our
sights on trying to make them understand things in what, I contend, is the
right way. Doing so will bring to the fore difficult political and moral
judgments that are at the heart of debates about discrimination broadly.
At a minimum, I hope to start a dialogue with the community that
provides evidentiary expert statistical services to litigants in discrimination
cases about how that material is consumed and given meaning in courts.
Social scientists can do more in the fight against discrimination than provide
technical skills; they can also offer careful reflexive thinking that rejects folk,
commonsense-sounding concepts of race. We must be vigilant to “uncover
the hidden assumptions in [our] own scientific unconscious . . . .” 32
I.

PRIMER: THICK ETHICAL CONCEPTS AND
CONSTITUTIVE EXPLANATIONS

Discrimination is, to borrow from Bernard Williams, a “thick ethical
concept” that simultaneously describes and evaluates the object to which it
is applied. 33 To know if something is DISCRIMINATION, one needs thick
sociological and anthropological knowledge about what constitutes the
31 Others have raised objections to talking about race as a variable that causes other variables,
highlighting that the practice is complicit (or active) in reifying race as an essential trait. See, e.g., TUKUFU
ZUBERI, THICKER THAN BLOOD: HOW RACIAL STATISTICS LIE 29–31 (2001); Philip Goodman, Race in
California’s Prison Fire Camps for Men: Prison Politics, Space, and the Racialization of Everyday Life,
120 AM. J. SOC. 352 (2014); Tukufu Zuberi, Deracializing Social Statistics: Problems in the
Quantification of Race, 568 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 172 (2000). I draw on these objections
in Parts III and IV.
32 EMIRBAYER & DESMOND, supra note 16, at 72.
33 WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 155–56 (“Many exotic examples of these can be drawn from other
cultures, but there are enough left in our own: coward, lie, brutality, gratitude, and so forth. They are
characteristically related to reasons for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides
someone with a reason for action, though that reason need not be a decisive one and may be outweighed
by other reasons, as we saw with their role in practical reasoning in Chapter 1. Of course, exactly what
reason for action is provided, and to whom, depends on the situation, in ways that may well be governed
by this and by other ethical concepts, but some general connection with action is clear enough. We may
say, summarily, that such concepts are ‘action-guiding.’”).
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categories to which it is applied: how certain practices, acts, and
understandings differentiate humans into distinct social kinds known as
RACES or ETHNICITIES, and, conversely, how such constituted categories
give meaning to acts and credentials. One also needs a normative theory
about the fair and just basis for making decisions, which can be advanced
only in light of the sociological or anthropological facts that make race or
ethnicity a meaningful category whereby it is discriminatory—as opposed to
just irrational or idiosyncratic—to act on it. Said another way, unless we have
a moral critique of how such categories operate, we have no grounds to
identify acts or practices as discriminatory. 34 How should we think about
detecting such a thick ethical concept?
In my view, the only plausible account of what we are doing when we
set out to detect discrimination is seeking “constitutive explanations,” which
in turn ground thick ethical claims. Constitutive explanations explain
properties of a system “by appealing to their parts and their organization.” 35
For example, one might say that a wine glass broke in response to the strike
of a spoon because it was fragile. 36 The explanation references what
constitutes fragility by “detail[ing] the relevant aspects of the object’s
molecular structure that make it fragile,” and by so doing, we understand
why, under “certain enabling and triggering conditions,” the object breaks. 37
Or to say that the salt dissolved in water because it is water-soluble is to offer
an explanation that references what constitutes salt––namely sodium and
34

If one is just enforcing accepted roles, then an act cannot be said to be discriminatory, as, for
example, in the case of a parent–child relationship. There must be a critique of the reproduction of the
status to identify something as discriminatory vis-à-vis that status. If, for example, an employer says a
woman is being dismissed not because she is pregnant but because she needs physical accommodations
to perform her job, that act can be identified as pregnancy discrimination only by referencing what
pregnancy consists of (the physical changes entailed in the condition) and by relying on a moral theory
designating what’s fair given what pregnancy is.
35 Petri Ylikoski, Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared, 78 ERKENNTNIS 277, 277–78
(2013). Robert Cummins calls the search for constitutive explanation “property theories,” which seek to
“explain the properties of a system not in the sense in which this means ‘Why did S acquire P?’ or ‘What
caused S to acquire P? but, rather, ‘What is it for S to instantiate P?’, or, ‘In virtue of what does S have
P?’” ROBERT CUMMINS, THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 14–15 (1983) (emphasis
added). Cummins goes on to give the example of the kinetic theory of heat as a property theory because
“it explains temperature in a gas by explaining how temperature is instantiated in a gas; it does not, by
itself, explain changes in temperature.” Id.
36 A constitutive explanation states a relation of dependence (on the property of fragility) that holds
constant the triggering conditions (the spoon strike) just like a counterfactual causal explanation—e.g.,
“the glass broke because it was struck by the spoon”—holds constant the constitutive properties of the
glass (its fragility) and imagines varying the triggering condition (strike vs. no strike of the spoon).
37 This example is taken from Ylikoski, supra note 35, at 278–80; see also NANCY CARTWRIGHT,
HUNTING CAUSES AND USING THEM: APPROACHES IN PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 14–23 (2007)
(discussing the causal capacities of complex nonmodular systems like a carburetor that can be understood
only by reference to the system’s overall geometry and structure of its component parts).
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chloride atoms combined in an ionic bond––to make sense of a dispositional
property of the substance when met with a different substance that consists
of one atom of oxygen bound to two hydrogen atoms with covalent bonds.38
To ask if something happened “because of race” similarly calls for a
constitutive explanation, one that references the complex system of social
meanings and relations that make up the very category. 39 To say, for
example, “I was not given a traffic ticket when I was pulled over for speeding
because I am white” is to offer a constitutive explanation that references what
constitutes WHITENESS—namely, a social type entailing a presumption of
noncriminality and deservedness of leniency and respect. If I further contend
that it was racially discriminatory that I was not given a ticket, then I am
invoking a thick moral claim that is only intelligible if one understands what
whiteness consists of. I am saying that the act ought to be condemned
because of the manner in which it relies upon meanings or perpetuates
understandings that make out the social kind WHITE.
Constitutive explanations proffer counterfactual dependence: to say
that a given system has a particular causal capacity or dispositional
properties because of how it is constituted means that if you changed the
parts and organization of the system, it would have different causal capacities
or dispositional properties. But it would also be a different system; the
category doing the causing would be a different category, just as two
different allotropes are constituted by different structural arrangements and
bonds of the same atoms. Diamond and graphite are both allotropes of the
same atom, but because of the different structural arrangements and bonds
(i.e., what constitutes them) they are different substances, which, in turn,
display different dispositional chemical and physical properties.
That is the heart of the difference between counterfactual causal claims
and constitutive causal claims: counterfactual causal claims track an
etiological dependence, whereas constitutive causal claims track the
38

As Cummins puts it: “To explain a dispositional regularity, then, we must explain how or why
manifestations of the disposition are brought about given the requisite precipitating conditions.”
CUMMINS, supra note 35, at 19. Much of natural science is about offering constitutive explanations. See,
e.g., CARL F. CRAVER, EXPLAINING THE BRAIN: MECHANISMS AND THE MOSAIC UNITY OF
NEUROSCIENCE 107–12 (2007).
39 Or consider the analogy to witchcraft offered by Karen Fields and Barbara Fields in their brilliant
book Racecraft: “Witchcraft . . . acquires perfectly adequate moving parts when a person acts upon the
reality of the imagined thing; the real action creates evidence for the imagined thing. . . . In Luther’s day,
learned jurists and ecclesiastics produced mountains of such evidence.” KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J.
FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 22 (2012). In an enchanted world
where witches are feared entities, the sentence “She was killed because she was a witch” calls forth a
constitutive explanation about the social kind “witch,” one that refers to the content and structure of a
system of religious beliefs and cultural understandings that made it possible to apprehend such a thing as
“witch” and how those constitutive elements entail fear and violent rejection of that kind.
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dependence of capacities of systems to the precise “properties of parts and/or
their organization,” which make the system what it is. 40 The proposition “If
I had been black, I would have gotten a ticket” is really just another way of
saying the social type BLACK is treated P-way in X encounters and the social
type WHITE is treated G-way in X encounters. The proffered counterfactual
does not get us to the discriminatory label without a moral theory that social
types BLACK and WHITE both ought to be treated G-way (or P-way) in X
encounters. But note that such a moral theory can only be advanced in light
of what it is to have stratified racial social types BLACK and WHITE; we can
only pick out acts that ought to be condemned in the specific way the label
“racially discriminatory” condemns if we know which of the meanings,
practices, and relations that constitute social kinds by race we want to
disavow. And that, I take it, is the very point of the antidiscrimination
project: to transform the social meaning of social categories that have—for
so long, in so many domains—been infused with disfavor and disadvantage.
Defining discrimination as a thick ethical concept whose detection
demands an explanation of constitutive dependence—namely, analyzing
how the distinctive wrongfulness of the action or practice is dependent upon
what the category of race consists of—as opposed to identifying a valueneutral fact of counterfactual dependence—namely, determining if the
person’s (or unit’s) racial trait had been different, but nothing else, whether
the action would have taken place—is a major conceptual shift. It requires
abandoning common ways of talking about race as an attribute or trait and
revising the hegemonic way causality is invoked to identify discrimination.
Before the reader despairs that I am offering a much too complicated and
fussy conceptual apparatus to deal with a fairly obvious set of questions, let
me suggest that the possibility of thinking of race as an isolated unit attribute
that can be manipulated without diffusing the very meaning of the unit for
purposes of detecting discrimination is only possible because of our own
“prenotions” about the category from living in a deeply racialized society.41
If we properly understand the category, then it is impossible to think of it in
terms of an isolated treatment.
Sometimes a fantastical analogy shakes away the blinders of our own
taken-for-granted categories. Consider an island society where the categories
of social stratification are binary: Royal and non-Royal. The privileged class,
Royal, wears purple capes and carries sticks. Their cultural tastes define what
40 Ylikoski, supra note 35, at 290. To be system S is to have parts and organization P-O and to be
1
1
system S2 is to have parts and organization P-O2 and so on and so forth.
41 See DURKHEIM, supra note 17, at 39–46; EMIRBAYER & DESMOND, supra note 16, at 31–33, 49
(calling for a “rigorous and methodological delineation of the problem at hand, rather than an uncritical
acceptance of definitions already provided by folk wisdom and/or academic culture”).
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is deemed high and valuable in this society, they occupy more prestigious
occupations on the island, hoard more resources, etc.—you get the idea. To
say that Royal is a social construct means that Royal is not merely the
attribute of wearing purple capes and carrying sticks. Royal is a cultural
category of thought and action constituted by a complex set of social
relations and meanings that interactionally give import to indices of the
category, such that the stick becomes a royal scepter and the cape becomes
a sacred robe.
A visiting anthropologist observes that in this society non-Royals step
off the sidewalk when Royals are walking on the sidewalk. In order to
properly characterize that action in a thick way—as non-Royal debasement
(or, conversely, respectful Royal obedience)—she would need to first
understand how the categories Royal and non-Royal are constituted in this
society by analyzing social relations and cultural meanings. If she were to
characterize the action as spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space
or the expression of idiosyncratic sidewalk-versus-road personal
preferences, she would misunderstand the meaning of the action in the
culture. The visiting anthropologist would have no way of making sense of
the fact that people with certain attributes (lacking capes and sticks)
consistently step off the sidewalk when people with other attributes (capes
and sticks) approach, or, more importantly, of making sense of why the
former are consistently disadvantaged in other arenas of social and economic
life. Nor would she be able to make sense of the moral dimension to the
debate in the island’s political body over a bill requiring that all people walk
on the sidewalk all of the time, especially when other laws on the island
defend the right to express personal preferences in the market or intimate
affairs, and when the culture generally applauds solving coordination
problems without government direction.
The visiting anthropologist could not classify the sidewalk action as
non-Royal debasement simply by asking, “If I changed an isolated trait about
a person (cape, stick) and nothing else changed about that person, would
other pedestrians have remained on the sidewalk?” A lot of things change if
she makes that manipulation in this society: namely, people no longer
perceive a Royal to be walking down the sidewalk! It is only possible for
those in the culture to react to the category of Royal because they recognize
the indices of Royal to mean something significant beyond the holding of a
stick or wearing of a cape. The way those meanings are embodied in the
sidewalk behavior is precisely what the anthropologist is trying to capture so
that she might properly understand the sidewalk behavior, which means she
is seeking a constitutive explanation. She must explain how the structures of
social relations and cultural meanings that constitute the very categories of
1180
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Royal and non-Royal make this action recognizable as non-Royal
debasement, as opposed to spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space
or randomly distributed preferences for when to walk on the sidewalk versus
the road.
And yet, in our culture, the most common way of defining
discrimination depends upon conceptualizing one of our society’s most
important categories of social stratification as a trait that can be isolated and
manipulated as a treatment, instead of as a social construct whose structure
of meaning must be analyzed in order to make sense of a particular instance
of action, patterned practice, or policy.
II. THE COUNTERFACTUAL CAUSAL MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LAW
This is not the doctrinal Part. Rather, this Part reveals that a common
approach—perhaps the most common approach—in both law and social
science to detecting discrimination is to measure the treatment effect of race
in the counterfactual sense. Part III carefully explicates this counterfactual
causal model (CCM), but for purposes of this Part the succinct sketch
presented in the Introduction is sufficient to identify its pervasiveness, either
explicitly or implicitly, in both domains.
I provide an overview of both law and social science because my sense
is that the hegemony of the CCM is the product of multiple, interactive
developments including, on the one hand, an intentional drive to narrow the
ambits of equal protection doctrine, and on the other hand, quantitative
methods for detecting discrimination filling in a substantive meaning of the
concept DISCRIMINATION that is otherwise lacking with indeterminate formal
formulations such as “equal protection,” “treating like cases alike,” or
“similarly situated.” 42 At the risk of being repetitive, this Part does not
evaluate whether the studies and cases cited in this Section correctly detect
discrimination, because my argument is that we can never answer that
question without a prior sociological account of the category and moral
theory of fair decision-making or resource allocation in the relevant domain
in light of what the category is in a particular place and time. My aim is
simply to show that these studies often proceed as if the aim of the exercise
is to get at a pure treatment effect of race or ethnicity presuming there is an
objective trait there to be gotten at after stripping away confounders.
Many social scientists explicitly embrace a definition of discrimination
as the causal effect of race (or ethnicity or sex). For example, the prestigious
42 Explaining how and why this model came to occupy the position it does is a project for another
article altogether.
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National Research Council’s report Measuring Racial Discrimination says
that “to measure discrimination researchers must answer the counterfactual
question: What would have happened to a nonwhite individual if he or she
had been white?” 43 The report goes on to illustrate both the logic of
counterfactual causal inference and the conceptualization of race implicated
by the model by appealing to Dr. Seuss’s book The Sneetches. In that book,
Sneetches stamped with a star get access to all sorts of social goods (like
killer hot dogs) while starless Sneetches are excluded, get lesser goods (like
tofu-dogs), and are despised. The authors note that because we cannot
“stamp” race on individuals and thereby directly observe counterfactual
outcomes on the same humans with different racial stamps at different times,
we must resort to second-best methods for drawing causal inferences about
the causal impact of race. 44 Numerous scholars praise the precision of the
counterfactual causal definition of discrimination and name audit studies as
the gold standard in causal inference. 45 Many notable studies of
discrimination in various arenas explicitly or implicitly adopt this model,
either by defining discrimination as the causal effect of race alone, or simply
by adopting a method that attempts to compare outcomes between units of
different racial status that are similarly situated with respect to an exhaustive

43 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 77 (Rebecca M. Blank et
al. eds., 2004). Indeed, the chapter is entitled “Causal Inference and the Assessment of Racial
Discrimination.”
44 Observational studies are placed lower down in the “hierarchy of approaches to data collection.”
Id. at 81.
45 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment
by Police, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 487 (2016) (“Auditing has not been tried or even discussed in the
law enforcement field, which is surprising because for decades it has been a central tool in
antidiscrimination research and civil rights enforcement more generally. It presents safety, legality, and
efficacy concerns when applied to policing, but with careful design I argue that these concerns can be
overcome. If so, auditing could provide something observational research usually cannot: causally
rigorous analysis of police discrimination in a real-world setting.”); Lincoln Quillian, Book Review,
35 CONTEMP. SOC. 88, 89 (2006) (reviewing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43) (“Racial
discrimination is defined with reference to counterfactual notions of causality developed in statistics:
racial discrimination for an individual is the difference in an outcome if an individual were of one race
contrasted to another race. This definition is cleverly illustrated with reference to the Dr. Seuss story The
Sneetches. The fundamental methodological problem of measuring discrimination results because, unlike
the Sneetches, we do not observe outcomes for each person under both racial conditions. Instead, we must
use indirect techniques to estimate the magnitude of racial discrimination.”). A more recent National
Academies report also endorses the counterfactual causal definition of discrimination, with the
qualification that laboratory methods for detecting it face external validity challenges. NATIONAL
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 256 (2018)
(“Studies of behavior in a simulated laboratory environment[] offer the benefit of studying how people
make decisions in situations where, by construction, the only variable that differs across encounters is the
race of the subject.”).
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set of imaginably decision-relevant characteristics (often limited by what is
available in administrative data). 46
Nothing in the text of the Constitution necessitates specifying racial
discrimination as the CCM; the relevant text merely articulates practically
indeterminate formal principles. The Fourteenth Amendment commands that
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws”; here, as in any other principle of formal equality, there is no
way to apply the principle without an independent account of what equal
protection means and the values underlying such a judgment. 47
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . .
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.” 48 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, 49
46 See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Market, in
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3143, 3192 (1999), https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/labchp/3-48.html
[https://perma.cc/MF32-MF8G] (“To investigate the presence of discrimination, one would like to be able
to compare the outcomes of individuals in the same job who are identical in all respects that are relevant
to performance but who differ only in race, ethnicity or gender.”); Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The
Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer
Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 184 (2008) (“While statistical models represent an extremely important
approach to the study of race differentials, researchers should use caution in making causal interpretations
of the indirect measures of discrimination derived from residual estimates.”); Lincoln Quillian, New
Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 299, 302 (2006)
(“To estimate the magnitude of discrimination in a particular context then involves answering a
counterfactual question: What would the treatment of target group members have been if they had been
dominant group members? This counterfactual notion of discrimination measurement corresponds to the
use of counterfactuals in the causal effects literature (Winship & Morgan 1999). Discrimination is the
causal effect of race on an outcome with other factors held constant.”); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force 35–38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22399, 2018).
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The entire “equality of what” debate in egalitarianism is about this
same issue. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities, 56 LOUVAIN
ECON. REV. 357, 357 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 185, 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283, 283 (1981); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 307 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995). And for a brilliant critique of the
terms in which this debate is framed, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?,
109 ETHICS 287, 287 (1999). Similar arguments about the need for a substantive account of the values
behind equality or the material to be equalized have been artfully developed in other subject areas such
as tort law, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill Lecture in
Jurisprudence and Public Policy), 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 91 (1995), and of course extensively in
antidiscrimination law, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 9, 9 (2003); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107–
08 (1976); Post, supra note 30, at 14.
48 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
49 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
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the formal equal protection demand to treat like cases alike has boiled down
to three doctrinal formulations of discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause in federal courts: (1) explicit racial classification; 50 (2) facially neutral
law or policy that has a disparate racial impact and was motivated by
discriminatory animus or intent; 51 and (3) facially neutral law or policy that
is applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner and results in a disparate
impact. 52
The practical result is that in order for a litigant to show that a particular
practice that does not facially classify by race was discriminatory, he or she
must show that the practice had discriminatory effects and that the decisionmaker intended to discriminate. Circularity at its finest: Discrimination =
discriminatory effect + discriminatory intent. 53 The term we are trying to
define enters into the terms doing the definitional work and is seemingly
essential to it, as otherwise we have no way of distinguishing permissible
from impermissible effects and intents.
Faced with an indeterminate circular definition, one can see the
attraction of the CCM: it seems to provide a way of distinguishing between
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory effects by reference to what is
essentially functionally rational criteria. In selective prosecution and
enforcement cases (i.e., discrimination by law enforcement in selection of
targets, or discrimination by prosecutors regarding cases referred by law
enforcement, respectively), that is usually articulated as the “similarly
situated” test: “[C]ourts have required a defendant to make a credible
showing that a similarly situated individual of another race or ethnicity could
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to
the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” (internal citations
omitted)).
50 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
51 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (holding an Alabama law
disenfranchising those convicted of certain crimes invalid because it was enacted with a racially
discriminatory purpose and had a racially disparate impact).
52 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution.”); see also Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to
establish a violation of equal protection by intentional discrimination may proceed in ‘several ways,’
including by pointing to a law that expressly classifies on the basis of race, a facially neutral law or policy
that has been applied in an unlawfully discriminatory manner, or a facially neutral policy that has an
adverse effect and that was motivated by discriminatory animus.”).
53 For example, consider the following explication: “[A] plaintiff alleging the discriminatory
application of a neutral law or policy must demonstrate that the application of the policy was motivated
by discrimination.” Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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have been subjected to the same law enforcement action as the defendant,
but was not.” 54
The obvious problem with defining unlawful discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment as synonymous with functional irrationality is that
it undercuts the entire logic of equal protection jurisprudence’s graded
scrutiny scale under which allegations of racial discrimination are subject to
the most exacting demands for rationality. 55 Some prior principle is
necessary to explain why the state need only proffer some minimally logical
account for how a nonracial classification—such as “bunioned,” i.e., the
status of having a bunion—advances a legitimate state interest, whereas
racial classifications require “the most exact connection between
justification and classification,” in order to “satisfy this searching standard
of review,” in which the state must demonstrate that the classification was
“‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.” 56 An
obvious candidate would be the famous Carolene Products-footnote-fourtype answer: that being in the group designated “black” in America is
associated with political vulnerability, a history of social exclusion,
economic disadvantage, and cultural prejudice, whereas being in the group
“bunioned” is not. 57 But once one accepts such a principle to justify the
graded scrutiny scale (which, alternatively, could just as well be expressed
in terms of what sorts of rationales or state interests will be recognized as
legitimate for different types of groups), then the most concerning forms of
discrimination cannot be defined as decision-making on the basis of

54

United States v. Duque–Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153 (D. Kan. 2004).

This element of a “similarly situated individual” has been applied in claims of selective
prosecution, to require a defendant to show not only that his racial or ethnic group is prosecuted
more than another group, but that a similarly situated individual in another group was not
prosecuted for the same offense.
Id.

55 “It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is
to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944).
56 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (internal
citations omitted).
57 The famous footnote emerged from a case where the Court upheld a statute forbidding the
interstate commerce in “filled milk,” stating that “the existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions”;
however, “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” including “statutes
directed at particular religious . . . or racial minorities, . . . [or] against discrete and insular
minorities . . . .” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938).
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“irrelevant” factors. 58 And yet the entire logic of the CCM is to define
discrimination as a form of irrationality, which requires units (persons,
neighborhoods, etc.) to present with identical functionally relevant
characteristics in order to elicit differential effects.
Many (but not all) courts have operationalized both requirements of an
equal protection claim—differential outcomes by protected group
(discriminatory effect) and differential outcome because of the protected
group status (discriminatory intent)—in counterfactual terms. 59 As the
examples in the remainder of this Section show, litigants faced with this
evidentiary burden often turn to quantitative methods to attempt to show both
that there are differential outcomes by group and that, if those groups are
otherwise similarly situated with respect to all other relevant characteristics
or traits, race was the “cause” by elimination. To pursue this strategy, a
litigant needs data on the relevant units indicating raced status (either at the
individual or aggregate level depending on the unit of analysis), the outcome
of interest (e.g., pedestrian or traffic stop, adverse police action, arrest, etc.),
and other variables theoretically germane to the outcome. Armed with this
data, a litigant then just needs to hire a statistical expert to use some
methodologically sophisticated techniques to try to demonstrate that
differential outcomes persist between “similarly situated” units.
The promise of quantitative evidence (or experimental or quasiexperimental evidence) is obvious: It offers a way to proceed despite the
doctrinal narrowing of the ambits of equal protection initiated by Washington

58 The so-called “colorblindness” approach has often sounded in this “irrelevance” language. See,
e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. at 730 (“Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in
itself would ‘effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the “ultimate
goal” of “eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human
being’s race” will never be achieved.’” (internal citations omitted)). Presumably “irrelevance” here is
meant aspirationally, because the statuses about which we are the most concerned will be the objects of
discrimination are the ones where the status marker is highly correlated with other important social
indicators—which of course is precisely why we are concerned about those statuses being the object of
discrimination in the first instance—and therefore, it is empirically inaccurate to call the statuses
irrelevant.
59 This Section presents only a few examples of common formulations when the plaintiff is alleging
an equal protection violation of “a facially neutral” law or policy. In a case challenging, on First and Fifth
Amendment grounds, the “passive enforcement” practice of the Selective Service in which they initiated
prosecutions only against those individuals who either self-reported refusal to register or were reported
by others, the Supreme Court said, “It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to
ordinary equal protection standards. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both
that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (internal citation omitted);
see Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) (“To show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, plaintiffs must prove that the defendants’ actions had a discriminatory effect and were
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”).
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v. Davis. 60 Some litigants can show that differential outcomes persist after
controlling for every conceivable decision-relevant variable. But many
cannot do so. The challenge for litigants to demonstrate “similarly situated”
units is most pronounced when the historical forces of racial and ethnic group
formation have created separate social and physical worlds for different
groups. 61 Defendants can, drawing on their knowledge about how race and
ethnicity structure the social world, easily construct a post hoc list of
variables that are unequally distributed by race or ethnicity (making it very
difficult, if not impossible, to find the applicable counterfactual) that could
theoretically “justify” the disparate treatment.
Quantitative evidence based on multivariable regressions can work well
for litigants in situations where the “effect of race” on an outcome—meaning
the statistical significance of the variable measuring race (or racial
60

As many have noted, judges politically dedicated to narrowing the uses of equal protection
challenges have actively done so under many doctrinal formulations over recent decades. This is a
massive topic but see, for example, IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 158–62 (2006); Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967–1004
(2010); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–62 (1991);
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278–367 (2011); and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331–
87 (1988).
61 Sometimes, but not always, courts recognize this dilemma. In the Pyke case, which did not involve
quantitative evidence, Native American opponents of gambling living on a reservation claimed an equal
protection violation alleging that the state of New York failed to provide them with adequate police
protection “because the persons in need of protection were Native Americans,” but the defendants’
position was that they did not send the state police “to intervene in the events occurring on the reservation
because the Indian tribe exercises a considerable measure of self-governance on the reservation, and
because the violence on the reservation threatened the safety of the state police officers.” Pyke v. Cuomo,
258 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2001). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding
that the plaintiffs failed to allege an express racial classification or show that other similarly situated
groups were treated differently. Id. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that in a police discrimination
case (as opposed to selective prosecution), as long as plaintiffs “allege and establish that the defendants
discriminatorily refused to provide police protection because the plaintiffs are Native American, plaintiffs
need not allege or establish the disparate treatment of otherwise similarly situated non-Native American
individuals.” Id. at 109. The court recognized that
[i]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to find other individuals whose situation is similar to
Native Americans living on a reservation and exercising a substantial measure of self-government
independent of New York State. Plaintiffs would probably be incapable of showing similarly
situated individuals who were treated differently. If the rule were as framed by the district court,
police authorities could lawfully ignore the need of Native Americans for police protection on the
basis of discriminatory anti-Indian animus.
Id. Even if litigants are not required to come forward with similarly situated units that were treated
differently, many courts interpret legal rules such as the following to mean the status caused the outcome
in the counterfactual sense: “Once the plaintiff shows that the application was so motivated, ‘at least in
part,’ the defendant must show that the same result would have occurred even without consideration of
the plaintiffs[’] race or national origin.” Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing
United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600, 612 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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composition if the unit is an aggregation)—survives inclusion of a range of
variables plausibly relevant to the outcome of interest. 62 In Floyd v. City of
New York, for instance, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the racially disparate
impact of the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk (SQF) policy
could not be explained by “legitimate” bases for police decisions, such as
high crime rates in minority neighborhoods. 63 The exercise of making units
similarly situated included variables such as violent crime complaint rates,
which the police may have actually consulted in making enforcement
allocations. 64 But the models submitted by the plaintiff’s expert did not stop
there. They also included other variables—such as unemployment and
housing vacancy rates—that could be theoretically relevant to the number of
stops, but it is doubtful that the NYPD actually consulted these variables in
its decision-making. 65 The logic was that if racial composition remained a
statistically significant predictor of the intensity of stop-and-frisks even after
controlling for every other possible variable, then it must represent the
residual of racially discriminatory intent. The Floyd plaintiffs were
successful in demonstrating that the correlation between minority
composition (at the precinct or census-tract level) and SQF rates survived
the inclusion of a bevy of other variables plausibly relevant to police
allocation or enforcement decisions with lots of little stars of statistical

62 I put “effect of race” in scare quotes to indicate that the term should be understood as “statements
of association between the racial classification and a predictor or explanatory variable across individuals
in a population.” Zuberi, supra note 31, at 178.
63 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (accepting statistical findings that “the NYPD carries
out more stops in areas with more black and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables are
held constant. The best predictor for the rate of stops in a geographic unit—be it precinct or census tract—
is the racial composition of that unit rather than the known crime rate”).
64 Interestingly, the City’s expert rebuttal report seemed to take issue even with the model that serious
felony crime complaint rates should predict SQF rates because such a model fails to “confront the historic
shift at NYPD away from a primary mission of responding to crime to a mission of preventing crime
through proactive and crime targeted police vigilance.” Report of Dennis C. Smith, Ph.D., at 4, Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS)). Besides the
befuddling sentences, such as “[a]ny credible analysis of the determinates of stop and frisk activity must
first control for the impact of evidence-based management practices before trying to parse out any other
factors that may or may not have contributed to stop and frisk patterns,” it is left entirely unspecified in
the defendant’s report what indices the police would look at to make enforcement decisions in this new
era of scientifically managed crime prevention, if not recent past crime complaints. Id. at 5.
65 For example, the plaintiff’s expert analysis of SQF rates by spatial aggregations (police precincts
in the first expert report, Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 7–8, 12, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08
Civ. 1034 (SAS)), or census tracks in the second supplemental report, Second Supplemental Report of
Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 16–17, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS))) included variables
about which there appeared to be little to no evidence that police actually did take into direct account in
making patrol strength or tactics allocations, such as unemployment, median household income, housing
vacancy, or residential mobility. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra, at 31–32.
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significance. 66 But the same analysis might not succeed in a hypersegregated
city where the particularities of its racial history have produced a social
geography with few if any majority-black neighborhoods that share all
relevant characteristics with majority-white neighborhoods.
Consider, for example, United States v. Jones, a selective prosecution
challenge to Project Exile, which diverted gun cases from state to federal
court, where defendants faced significantly enhanced prison sentences.67
About 90% of the defendants in this program were black, and cases were
diverted from just two jurisdictions: the cities of Norfolk and Richmond,
Virginia, which had a jury pool that was about 75% African-American,
whereas other cases were diverted to the Richmond Division of the Eastern
District of Virginia, which had a jury pool that was about 10% AfricanAmerican; the plaintiffs submitted evidence that an AUSA “stated that one
goal of Project Exile is to avoid ‘Richmond juries.’” 68 Nonetheless, the court
stated that, while
Project Exile would be vulnerable on selective prosecution grounds if AfricanAmerican defendants were routinely diverted from state to federal prosecution
while prosecutors allowed similarly situated Caucasian defendants to remain in
state court[,] . . . [plaintiff] presents no evidence of Caucasian defendants
similarly situated to defendant Jones evading diversion to federal court. 69

The court was moved by the Government’s claim that “[t]hose who
implemented Project Exile have targeted cities in which violent crime is most
66 “After controlling for crime (prior month) and other tract social and economic characteristics plus
patrol strength, the percent black or Hispanic in the census tract significantly and positively predicts the
likelihood of Black suspects or Hispanic[] suspects being stopped relative to Whites.” Second
Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra note 65, at 19.
67 “Under Project Exile, local police review each firearm-related offense to determine whether the
conduct alleged also constitutes a federal crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(g) (prohibiting
the possession of firearms by certain persons).” United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va.
1999). Establishing discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent is further complicated by the
deference courts give certain categories of officials. Although the Supreme Court has instructed courts to
“judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards,” Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985), it has also gone to great lengths to say that separation of powers requires
courts to respect the discretion of prosecutors in selecting targets for prosecution. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial
power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985))); United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Armstrong was about prosecutorial
discretion. The defendants assumed that state and federal law-enforcement agents arrested all those they
found dealing in crack cocaine, and they suspected that the federal prosecutor was charging the black
suspects while letting the white suspects go. The Supreme Court replied that federal prosecutors deserve
a strong presumption of honest and constitutional behavior, which cannot be overcome simply by a racial
disproportion in the outcome, for disparate impact differs from discriminatory intent.”).
68 Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 307–08.
69 Id. at 311.
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prevalent,” which, because of the history of racial segregation and
discrimination, in most American cities are almost always the same spaces
that are predominantly African-American. 70
Or consider how the counterfactual model of discrimination plays out
in a series of “phony stash house” cases from across the country, in which
various law enforcement agencies use undercover agents or confidential
informants recruit targets to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent
stash house. 71 Once the robbery is arranged and coconspirators are recruited,
the targets are arrested and charged. Defendants have sought to dismiss
indictments on grounds of racial profiling or sought discovery in the hopes
of establishing as much. Most—though not all 72—judges have denied
defendants’ motions on the grounds that they could not prove that “similarly
situated” whites were not targeted. 73 In the face of overwhelming disparate
70

Id. at 312.
“Since 2006, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (the ‘ATF’) has engaged
in sting operations wherein undercover agents present individuals in this District with an opportunity to
rob a fictitious drug stash house.” United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
71

Developed by the ATF in the 1980s to combat a rise in professional robbery crews targeting stash
houses, reverse sting operations have grown increasingly controversial over the years, even as
they have grown safer and more refined. For one, they empower law enforcement to craft offenses
out of whole cloth, often corresponding to statutory offense thresholds. Here, the entirely fictitious
10 kilograms of cocaine triggered a very real 20-year mandatory minimum for Washington,
contributing to a total sentence of 264 months in prison—far more than even the ringleader of the
conspiracy received. For another, and as Washington claimed on multiple occasions before the
District Court—and now again on appeal—people of color are allegedly swept up in the stings in
disproportionate numbers.
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 713 (2018); John
Diedrich & Raquel Rutledge, ATF Uses Rogue Tactics in Storefront Stings Across Nation, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL (Dec. 7, 2013), http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/atf-uses-roguetactics-in-storefront-stings-across-the-nation-b99146765z1-234916641.html [https://perma.cc/W8U3264U].
72 See, e.g., Davis, 793 F.3d at 715, 723 (holding that limited discovery is appropriate in face of
statistics that of twenty stash house stings, seventy-five defendants were African-American, thirteen were
Hispanic, and only six were non-Hispanic whites).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Payne, No. 12 CR 854 (CRN), slip. op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2015)
(where statistics showing that only one of twenty-six stash house cases had a white defendant and almost
80% of defendants were African-American were insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory effect
because there is “no evidence . . . of other similarly situated individuals of a different race who were not
prosecuted”). In Lamar, the judge rejected the defendant’s claim that, given the existence of white
individuals with a similar criminal record, this pattern constituted sufficient evidence of discriminatory
effect to compel discovery on how the DEA selection took place:
The fact that none of the 95 defendants in these cases is white does not constitute “some evidence”
of either discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. A close review of the complaints in these
eighteen cases reveals that 76 of the 95 defendants in these cases were recruited not by a DEA
informant, but instead by a coconspirator.
United States v. Lamar, No. 14 CR 726 (PGG), 2015 WL 4720282, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015). The
court went on to reason in counterfactual terms, noting that the defendants conceded:
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racial impact, litigants are still expected to show that the effect of race and
race alone can be isolated from other factors to support a counterfactual
causal account of discrimination. One judge explained that defendants did
not meet their burden even to obtain discovery where zero of ninety-five
defendants in eighteen robbery sting cases in the Southern District of New
York were white because, among other things, they did not point to
incredibly specific evidence that “any white person who had been sentenced
under the Robbery Guidelines, or who had served time in a New York state
prison for a violent felony, ever told a DEA informant about past
involvement in robbing drug dealers but was not targeted for a sting
operation.” 74
Even if discovery is provided, it is not difficult for law enforcement to
come forward with plausible bases to distinguish potential targets as not
“similarly situated,” especially post hoc and especially when there are highly
unequal distributions between groups of variables that are plausibly rational
for law enforcement to consider, such as residence in high crime
neighborhoods or criminal history. Consider how this played out in a series
of high profile phony stash house cases in Chicago, where the court rejected
the defendants’ motions to dismiss indictments on equal protection grounds
after substantial discovery was provided and extensive warring expert
reports submitted, despite the judge’s statement that “[i]t is time for these
false stash house cases to end and be relegated to the dark corridors of our
past.” 75 Both experts—for the defendants seeking to establish discrimination
and for the government seeking to refute it—made their case in explicitly
counterfactual terms by arguing that they could (or could not) isolate the
effect of race in enforcement target selection; 76 and the court approached the
[They] have no “direct evidence” that (1) “an informant ever told [the DEA agents involved in
this case] about a white person who had robbed drug dealers or who might be interested in robbing
drug dealers, and that [the DEA agents involved in this case] indicated that they were [not]
interested in pursuing that person”; and (2) the DEA agents involved in this case “instructed
informants that the DEA was only interested in targeting non-white people who robbed drug
dealers or might be interested in robbing drug dealers.”
Id. at *10. Disclosure: I submitted an expert report in this case.
74 Lamar, 2015 WL 4720282, at *15.
75 Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 983–84.
76 See, e.g., Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 27–28, Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (No. 12-CR-632
(RC)) (citing audit studies as the ideal experiment to isolate the causal effect of race and adopting
propensity score matching to “simulate[] random assignment to a treatment group–race–by matching
persons on numerous predictors of treatment assignment”); Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach at
12, Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (No. 12-CR-632 (RC)) (arguing that to interpret residual differences in
likelihood of being targeted to discrimination methods must eliminate any systematic differences between
groups—including “willing[ness] to participate in a stash house robbery”—except for the racial/ethnic
status: “The control variables must capture the underlying differences between black, Hispanic, and white
offenders in the sample to such an extent that we can interpret the remaining differences between these
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evaluation of the evidence in counterfactual terms. 77 After an in-depth review
of the voluminous reports, the court held that the defendants failed to
establish either discriminatory effect or intent for many varied and complex
reasons; relevant to the discussion here, it concluded that the defendants did
not proffer a sufficiently “similarly situated” group of potential white targets
to prove race was the causal factor in enforcement selection. 78 The
counterfactual causal model proceeds as if race consists in only its
signifiers—say an attribute A—and discrimination is defined as the effect of
that A on an outcome when everything else—call them all of the other Xs—
are held constant. If there is no prior sociological account of the distribution
and meaning of the Xs by different racial/ethnic groups and no prior moral
equality-of-what theory designating in what fairness consists of given the
differential distribution and meaning of Xs by group, then there is no limiting
principle on what should or should not be stripped away in order to get at
some imagined solid state of race or ethnicity.
This logic is also on display in the use of racial-specific or ethnicspecific crime rates. 79 It turns out that far from the soaring rhetoric that “the
Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not “as simply components
groups as caused by discrimination.”). Sometimes the experts conflate two quite distinct counterfactual
questions, namely (1) What would the racial composition of phony stash house sting defendants be if the
ATF had been presented with a given quantum of potential black, Hispanic, and white targets that were
identical in all Xs (all conceivably relevant variables) except racial/ethnic status?, with (2) What would
the racial composition of the phony stash house sting defendants be if the ATF selected enforcement
targets in a nondiscriminatory fashion? See, e.g., Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach, supra, at 4.
The former is the CCM that I critique throughout on the grounds that it cannot identify discrimination
without a sociological account of the distribution and meaning of Xs by different racial/ethnic group and
a moral account of what enforcement target selection processes are fair or just given the differential
distribution and meaning of Xs by group. The latter proffers a counterfactual normative criterion that is
undefined, which would need to be given some content to know what its operation would generate
empirically.
77

[I]f Defendants prove that law enforcement agents would not have pursued these investigations
had they been white, dismissal of the charges is warranted. “If not, there would not be a basis to
attribute this prosecution to the defendants’ race,” and the case must proceed to a resolution of
the charges.
Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 995, 1006 (internal citation omitted).
78 Id. at 1013, 1022.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Duque–Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160 (D. Kan. 2004) (discussing
Hispanic profiling in Kansas, “the proper consideration here is whether there are any differences in the
incidence of traffic violations by different racial and ethnic groups when one considers all such violations,
and when one considers the host of reasons officers rely on in effecting a traffic stop”). I do not believe
that “similarly situated” with respect to functionally relevant characteristics is really doing the work it
claims to be doing in these cases, because the entire basis of concern about a group being the target of
discrimination is that one group is systematically different from another in socially important ways. Upon
closer inspection, the similarly situated inquiry is precisely where courts—without any explicit
acknowledgement—engage a substantive equality-of-what theory, specifying which facts that construct
racial and ethnic groups will be countenanced and which will not.
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of a racial, religious, sexual or national class,”’” courts end up engaging
social facts about an individual’s ascriptive group when it comes to this type
of inquiry. 80 The claim that the black stop rate should be proportional to the
rate at which complainants of violent crime describe the perpetrator as black,
or that the racial composition of phony stash house sting defendants should
match the composition of those arrested for home invasions with a firearm
or with “willingness” to participate in a stash house robbery, means that an
individual’s risk of stop or targeting is evaluated as fair by reference to a
proffered empirical fact about their ascribed group (or the “propensity” of
their ascribed group). 81 Let’s leave aside the difficulty of knowing the true
rates at which people ascribed to different ethnic or racial groups engage in
the offenses at issue in a particular discriminatory enforcement claim, or the
difficulty of assigning people to designated groups in a way that is not
endogenous to identifying an instance of the offense. 82 Proposing evidence
of differential racial or ethnic group offense rates to defeat a claim of
discrimination in a particular enforcement policy only works if one accepts
some prior independent moral justification of the policy or practice given the
claimed racial- or ethnic-specific offense rates. Declaring that the
enforcement action happens because of the underlying offending conduct—
and not because of race or ethnicity—is simply question-begging. The entire
premise of the discriminatory effects inquiry is to designate criteria by which
a policy that does not on its face classify by race or ethnicity produces
patterns that will be recognized as DISCRIMINATORY.
Many courts take the identical information—proffered racial- or ethnicspecific conduct rates—and insist that it is essential contextual evidence for
deciding if the effects really are discriminatory, but irrelevant for

80

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The City’s experts . . .
used a benchmark consisting of the rates at which various races appear in suspect descriptions from crime
victims—in other words, ‘suspect race description data’ . . . [and] assumed that if officers’ stop decisions
were racially unbiased, then the racial distribution of stopped pedestrians would be the same as the racial
distribution of the criminal suspects in the area.”); see also Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1012–13 (discussing
the Government’s expert report, “[a]s a ‘counterfactual’ to Professor Fagan’s findings, Professor
Schanzenbach . . . found that black, white, and Hispanic defendants in the stash house cases had
statistically similar criminal histories, and that on average, black defendants had more convictions, arrests,
and sentences, and were more likely to have been convicted or arrested for a weapons offense than white
defendants[;] . . . [o]f those arrested for weapons offenses, 72.5 percent were black and 15 percent were
Hispanic[;] . . . for home invasion with a firearm, 75.4 percent were black and 12 percent were Hispanic”).
82 Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity and Inequality in the United States,
118 AM. J. SOC. 676, 712 (2012) (showing that external racial identification changes over time by
redefining successful or high-status people as white (or not black) and unsuccessful or low-status people
as black (or not white)).
81
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determining whether to infer discriminatory intent.83 Consider, for example,
that many courts ruled that public perception of crack as a “black drug” was
irrelevant to finding that the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity between crack and
powdered cocaine was motivated by discriminatory intent. 84 The same
statistical facts that must be recognized to defuse the allegation of
discriminatory effect—say, a proffered correlation between group
membership and the facial target of the enforcement policy—are ignored
when interpreting the meaning of acting on the facial target of the
enforcement policy.
Having shown that many courts employ counterfactual-type reasoning
to evaluate evidence of racial and ethnic discrimination, the following Part
formalizes the counterfactual causal model in order to clarify precisely what
it means to talk about race as a cause in the counterfactual sense, and what it
means to define racial discrimination as the causal effect of race- or
ethnicity-qua-treatment. Most federal judges are not familiar with the
counterfactual causal framework presented in the next Part (although many
experts employed to provide statistical services are), and I certainly do not
contend that they are always consciously appealing to the formal model
when they approach discrimination cases. I do contend that if confronted
with the formalization, many of these legal actors would agree that it
represents the type of exercise in which they are engaged when detecting
discrimination.

83 Litigants claiming discrimination must show that a decision-maker “selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.” Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1985) (“Presented with a neutral state law that produces
disproportionate effects along racial lines, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the approach of
Arlington Heights to determine whether the law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: ‘[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’” (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977))).
84 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 713
(8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the idea that “Congress’ failure to account for a substantial and foreseeable
disparate impact” of the crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines on African-Americans could violate “the
spirit and letter of equal protection” because “belief that racial animus was a motivating factor, based on
disproportionate impact, is simply not enough since the Equal Protection Clause is violated ‘only if that
impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.’ The chain of reasoning of the district court simply will
not support a conclusion or a finding that the crack statutes were passed ‘because of, not merely in spite
of’ the adverse effect upon an identifiable group” (internal citations omitted)); David A. Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1995).
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III. THE FORMAL MODEL AND RACE AS A TREATMENT
The mechanics are a bit tedious, but it is important to explicitly detail
the primitives of the counterfactual model in order to clarify (1) what
definition of causality is at work, and (2) what conditions must obtain in
order to make meaningful empirical claims about the operation of causality
if one is using the word “cause” in the counterfactual sense. Only after
rigorously specifying what cause-qua-treatment means in the counterfactual
model can we understand the objections to identifying discrimination as the
treatment effect of race or ethnicity.
The primitives of the theory are as follows:
U is a population of n units consisting of ui . . . n.
Z is a treatment variable such that Z=t if ui is exposed to treatment conditions;
Z=c if ui is exposed to control conditions (no treatment).
Y is an outcome variable of interest measured on the units in U after
experiencing Z=t or Z=c. 85

The most simplistic causal question defines just two potential causes
(or levels of treatment): t for treatment and c for control (some defined nont state). Consider Z to be a variable indicating whether U is exposed to
treatment, in which case Z=t, or control, i.e., no treatment, in which case
Z=c. Each unit must be potentially exposable to either c or t. The variable Y
defines an outcome of interest on each unit in U. The outcome variable Y is
some measure of the effect of Z on an outcome on U that is, through some
measurement mechanism, assigned a value.
The heart of the potential outcomes models is that we must define not
just one value of the outcome variable for each unit but two: Yt(u) indicates
the value of the response variable for unit u when exposed to t; Yc(u)
indicates the value of the response variable for unit u when exposed to c (nott). 86 The treatment is some occurrence with a specific temporality and so the
85 The counterfactual model of causation is sometimes also called the “Rubin Model” or the
“potential outcomes” framework. There is a massive amount of literature on this, but just to name a few
seminal works, see, for example, STEPHEN L. MORGAN & CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP, COUNTERFACTUALS
AND CAUSAL INFERENCE: METHODS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (2007); Holland, supra
note 13, at 959; Donald B. Rubin, Comment: Which Ifs Have Causal Answers, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
961, 961–62 (1986); and Jerzy Splawa-Neyman, On the Application of Probability Theory to Agricultural
Experiments. Essay on Principles. Section 9., 5 STAT. SCI. 465 (1990). For a very clear and accessible
summary, see D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533,
557–63 (2008).
86 For simplicity’s sake, I follow Holland and denote the value of the outcome variable on unit u for
i
the world in which the unit experiences the treatment, Z=t, as Yt(u), and the value of the outcome variable
on unit ui for the world in which the unit experiences the control, Z=c, as Yc(u). Holland, supra note 13,
at 947.
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response variable Y must be measured at some point in time after t or c is
determined.
The individual causal effect of treatment t as measured by outcome
variable Y (relative to control state c) on unit u is defined as Yt(u) – Yc(u).
Note the causal effect is defined as the difference in the response variable
under treatment and control conditions for the same unit: it is the difference
between the value of Y for unit u that would obtain under treatment t, and
the value of Y for unit u that would obtain under control conditions. A causal
effect is defined in reference to a clear counterfactual (not-t, i.e., c), hence
the name counterfactual or potential outcome.
Causes in the statistical counterfactual paradigm must be, at the risk of
mixing disciplinary metaphors, what philosopher David Lewis called “nonbacktracking”; that is, it must be possible to imagine a treatment on the unit
at a given time (time=1) that does not entail a host of other changes to the
unit prior to that moment (time<1). 87 Backtracking counterfactuals recognize
that there are some changes in the current state of affairs that necessarily
imply that other entangled states were also changed. As Lewis explained, “if
the present were different, the past would be different too.” 88 By way of
example, consider an attempt to measure the causal impact of Hillary
Clinton—as opposed to Donald Trump—being inaugurated on January 20th,
2017 on Washington, D.C. Metro ridership. Obviously, a number of other
entangled prior events—potentially ranging from voter turnout to the timing
of the FBI’s announcement about finding a Clinton aide’s emails on Anthony
Weiner’s laptop—would have to have turned out differently in the past for a
Clinton inauguration to be a potential cause of a change in D.C. Metro
ridership. Such a question can only be specified as a backtracking
counterfactual. But treatments in the statistical counterfactual model exclude
backtracking. The model requires the possibility of a treated and nontreated
state for otherwise identical units that could bring about different potential
outcome states in the future without the treatment entailing other changes to
the unit in the past. 89
The fact that causation is defined in terms of the counterfactual
experience of one unit in two alternative conditions leads to what has been

87 See 2 DAVID LEWIS, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 33–35 (1986). As Lewis wrote, “[c]ounterfactuals
are infected with vagueness,” and “[d]ifferent ways of (partly) resolving the vagueness are appropriate in
different contexts.” Id. at 34.
88 Id. at 33.
89 As Lewis explained the nonbacktracking counterfactual requirement, “[I]f the present were
different the past would be the same, but the same past causes would fail somehow to cause the same
present effects.” Id. at 34.
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termed the “fundamental problem of causal inference.” 90 We only observe
either Yt(u) or Yc(u), so we can never identify the true causal effect. Bummer.
There are various methodological deliverances from this apparent
epistemic bummer. For purposes of our discussion here, the logic of these
methods involves trying to create or identify subgroupings of U exposed to
either t or c and measuring the outcome of interest, Y, on those subgroupings.
The aim of the various techniques is either to construct an assignment
process whereby there would be no reason to think there is a correlation
between the outcome of interest and assignment to the treatment category
(known as ignorability), or somehow to retroactively “balance” theoretically
relevant variables between the treated and control subgroups. Stated with
extreme simplification, one gets around the fundamental problem of causal
inference either by randomly assigning treatment, or by reconstructing two
groups of treated and control units that are similarly situated with respect to
all relevant variables and then estimating the average treatment effect
between the treated and control groups. 91
A. Is Race a Treatment? The Rubian Statistician’s Objection
Can race be a treatment—and thus a cause—in the counterfactual
framework? Surprisingly, given how common it is to talk about race as a
cause in this way, most statisticians working in this tradition would say no.
Or, more specifically, they would say no if the units about which we are
making causal inferences are the raced units (such as individuals). Although
many people have voiced this objection, I am calling it the Rubian
statistician’s objection after Donald Rubin, one of the early innovators of the
formal counterfactual causal model. 92 Most people working in this

90

Holland, supra note 13, at 947.
Quick and dirty, it goes like this: First, define the average causal effect, T, of treatment t (relative
to control state c) over many units in the population, U, as the expected value of the difference Yt(u) –
Yc(u) over all the u’s in U: T = E[Yt] – E[Yc]. Second, estimate what is observable: T* = E[Yt|t] – E[Yc|c].
Third, figure out under what conditions one might think that T* = T, i.e., disentangle association from
causation. The logic is to use other units to fill in the missing values of the counterfactual outcomes of
the units for the treatment or control each did not receive. There are a number of other assumptions
necessary to draw causal inferences not discussed at length here (for example, the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA), which means the treatment status of any unit does not affect the potential
outcomes of the other units (noninterference) and the treatments for all units are comparable (no variation
in treatment or, said another way, the outcome value for unit u when exposed to treatment t (Yt) is the
same no matter what mechanism is used to assign the unit to the treatment)).
92 As Rubin put it,
91

[W]ithin our model, each of the T treatments must consist of a series of actions that could be
applied to each experimental unit. This requirement may seem obvious, but some colloquial uses
of “cause” specify treatments that either cannot be applied or are so ambiguous that no series of
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framework would say a question like “Did Eddie Murphy’s race cause him
to get a free newspaper?” does not have meaning in the counterfactual causal
sense.
The first issue the Rubian statistician points to is that, as described
above, causes are interventions with a discrete temporal dimension. A
treatment (Z) is a manipulation of something on a unit (u) or something to
which the unit can be exposed that we hypothesize would bring about a
change in a measured outcome of interest (Y) about u. The unit must be
susceptible of being subject to the two distinct states of treated and
nontreated (Z=t and Z=c) such that it is meaningful to talk about the potential
outcomes of the same unit in these two states, Yt(u) or Yc(u). The famous
Rubin/Holland slogan—“No causation without manipulation”—captures the
definitional requirement in the counterfactual model that causes are only
those things that we can, at least hypothetically, bring about on the unit. 93 If
Eddie Murphy’s race is an “immutable characteristic” assigned at birth, then
it is not meaningful to talk about his race as a cause of an outcome within the
counterfactual causal paradigm because it cannot be intervened on at some
later point. 94 Race is not a manipulative variable on the unit, but a trait of the
unit of interest. 95
actions can be inferred from the description of the treatment; such questions have no causal answer
within our framework.
Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects: The Role of Randomization, 6 ANNALS STAT.
34, 39 (1978).
93 Holland, supra note 13, at 959.
An attribute cannot be a cause in an experiment, because the notion of potential exposability does
not apply to it. The only way for an attribute to change its value is for the unit to change in some
way and no longer be the same unit. Statements of “causation” that involve attributes as “causes”
are always statements of association between the values of an attribute and a response variable
across the units in a population.
Id. at 955; see also Tyler J. VanderWeele & Whitney R. Robinson, On the Causal Interpretation of Race
in Regressions Adjusting for Confounding and Mediating Variables, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 473, 473 (2014)
(“Part of the challenge of interpreting race coefficients causally is that, in the formal causal inference
literature, effects are often defined in terms of counterfactual or potential outcomes, which are in turn
defined as the outcomes that would result under hypothetical interventions. There are, however, no
reasonable hypothetical interventions on race when race itself is the exposure.” (footnote omitted)).
94 There are many critiques of the Rubian causal framework and different approaches to causality,
but I focus on this framework because it best captures the hegemonic approach in courts and social science
of defining discrimination as a causal relation between a protected attribute and an outcome.
95 The statistician’s objection to thinking about race as a cause-qua-treatment is often explained (and
debated) in terms of nonmanipulability: the physical impossibility of bringing about a change in the race
of an individual at some point after birth. E.g., JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY
OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION 132 (2003); Alexandre Marcellesi, Is Race a Cause?, 80 PHIL. SCI. 650, 652–
53 (2013). But, as explained below, the entire terms of that debate miss the real question—What notion
of RACE is presupposed by a model in which it can theoretically be a treatment, and is that notion
sociologically plausible?
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Second, as a consequence of this, the most important other facts about
the unit happen posttreatment, and therefore, there is no way to separate out
the causal effect of the treatment from mechanisms or intermediate
outcomes. It is meaningless to talk about, for example, a white Eddie
Murphy, because every aspect of Eddie Murphy’s person from birth onwards
was formed by living as a black man in the United States of America. The
methodological problem this poses is that we cannot separate the fact of
Eddie Murphy being black from other facts about him—class, education,
humor, affect, dress, speech, etc.—in order to isolate the causal force of race
alone on an outcome of interest. To use the language of backtracking, it is
hard to imagine a treatment to his person to be white at, say, age twentythree, without backtracking a substantial number of other facts about his life
that would have been different if he had been born, raised, and perceived to
be white his entire life prior to age twenty-three. With respect to
observational methods that try to construct comparable subgroupings, we
cannot “control for” or “balance on” all of the theoretically relevant
posttreatment intermediate outcomes because, said in fancy statistical
language, “controlling for a post-treatment variable messes up the estimate
of total treatment effect . . . .” 96
These are the standard statistical, definitional, and methodological
objections to talking about race as a cause-qua-treatment. Much of this has
been stated, restated, and debated at length in the social science and statistics
literature. 97 Ultimately, I want to put a sociological spin on the Rubian
statistician’s objection, but for now I sum up the statistician’s objections to
talking about race as a treatment in two points: (1) nonmanipulability: the
units are not equally potentially exposable to treatment and control; and (2)
temporality of treatment: the inherent confoundedness of treatment effects
and posttreatment intermediate outcomes.
B. Is Race a Treatment? The Greiner–Rubin Statistician’s Solution
But statisticians don’t just have objections; they also have solutions.
The following Section argues that the statistician’s solution is an
unsatisfactory model of discrimination for the same reasons that I believe the
statistician’s objections outlined in the prior Section have deep sociological

96 ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 188 (2007).
97 See generally MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 85, at 439; D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin,
Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 775 (2011); Holland,
supra note 13; Marcellesi, supra note 95, at 655; Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race as a Bundle of Sticks:
Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 499
(2016).
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meaning, deeper meaning than I think they have been given in the
methodological debate. But first, the proffered solution.
The statistician’s solution to the objections to talking about race as a
cause-qua-treatment within the counterfactual causal framework is to switch
the unit of analysis from the raced unit (person, aggregation of persons) to
the decision-maker confronting the raced units. James Greiner and Donald
Rubin present the most eloquently formalized version of this solution,
although it is the same logic informing audit or correspondence studies
(insofar as they claim to identify a treatment effect of race, which is in no
way a logical entailment of the method).98 Greiner and Rubin describe the
solution as a “shift in emphasis to perceptions of immutable characteristics,”
arguing that this “allows some well-defined causal questions to be posed and,
within the limits of observational studies, inferences to be drawn,” or
alternatively, at least to “identify a set of assumptions that allows causal
analysis.” 99
The basics of the approach go something like this: The unit is a
decision-maker with power to determine the outcome of interest (Y). The
decision-maker perceives a distinct candidate unit (candidates for the
outcome of interest). The treatment is the “immutable characteristic” of the
candidate as perceived by the decision-maker. 100 Thus, the unit about which
we are making causal inferences is the decision-maker, which could be an
individual or aggregate decision-maker such as a firm or police department.
The treatment is the perceived race of a candidate unit, and the outcome of
interest is some outcome (Y), over which the decision-maker has the power
to decide.
The statistician’s solution addresses both the manipulability and
temporality of treatment objections summarized in the prior Section. It
addresses the manipulability issue by varying the race of the candidate units
98 For clear explanations of the decision-maker causal inference framework, see Greiner & Rubin,
supra note 97, at 776, and MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 85, at 440–41.
99 Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 776. Many people embrace this as the right conceptualization
for thinking about discrimination as the causal effect of race, ethnicity, or sex. See, e.g., JOSHUA D.
ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S
COMPANION 5 (2009); Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical
Challenges 32 (U. Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-003, Jan. 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2550032 [https://perma.cc/7XZS-FGQA].
100 Greiner and Rubin use the language of “perceived race,” supra note 97, at 775, but as I will argue
in the following Section on audit and correspondence studies, it is better described as “signaled race”
because the treatment is using one of various ways in which the social category of race is triggered
visually, aurally, or with written signs. See Sen & Wasow, supra note 97, at 509 (“[T]he best way to think
about the treatment in exposure [design] studies is not as perception but instead as a signal about race.
After all, in an experimental context, the researcher can manipulate the signal to which the subject is
exposed but not what the subject actually perceives. Second, perceived race is rarely observed . . . .”).
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a decision-maker perceives as opposed to manipulating the race of the
candidates themselves. It addresses the temporality of treatment issue by
locating the treatment at one salient moment in time—at the time the
decision-maker is appraised of the raced status of the candidate or racial
composition in the case of aggregate units. Defining the treatment as the
moment of racial perception allows one to control for or balance many
variables theoretically related both to race and to the outcome of interest,
because they can now be thought of as pretreatment.
As in any “clinching” deductive method, very strict assumptions must
be fulfilled to “clinch” the conclusion of causality. 101 One assumption
necessary to draw causal inferences about the treatment effect of a perceived
candidate’s race on a decision-maker’s outcome is that there be some clear
concept of what the treatment and the counterfactual to the treatment is. The
decision-maker must have in her or his mind a unitary and discrete concept
of BLACK and WHITE (if we are talking about racial binaries) that is triggered
by a stimulus, rather than a multidimensional conception of RACEDNESS. 102
In addition, the treatment for all units must be identical, meaning the singular
discrete concept of BLACK and WHITE triggered by the stimulus is the same
across potential decision-makers. 103 The method of treatment must not affect
the potential outcome, meaning how the decision-maker comes to perceive
the raced status of the unit does not affect the outcome of interest. 104 Finally,
the noninterference assumption requires that the potential outcome of a
particular decision-maker does not depend on the treatment of candidate
units assigned to other decision-makers. 105
101 Nancy Cartwright, Are RCTs the Gold Standard?, 2 BIOSOCIETIES 11, 12 (2007) (“Clinchers are
deductive: if they are correctly applied and their assumptions are met, then if our evidence claims are true,
so too will be our conclusions—a huge benefit.”).
102 That can be relaxed, as Greiner and Rubin point out, supra note 97, at 778, but I think that just
pushes the envelope to depicting RACEDNESS as gradations of the solid thing RACE.
103 There are various ways to state the requirement that, however one defines the “treatment,” it must
be the same thing to every unit to which it is administered. Some versions of this requirement include the
following: there is only one version of each treatment; counterfactual states must be well-defined; the
treatment of different units is comparable; and there is a “single essential, counterfactual state” of treated
and control. See id.
104 The value of Y (u) (the outcome for unit u when exposed to treatment t) is the same no matter
t
what mechanism is used to assign the unit to the treatment. Imagine some decision-makers interact with
the units for long periods of time and others just interact for a short period of time; “[t]he critical
assumption here is that how the perception is created does not matter, that is, the counterfactual potential
outcome is ‘stable,’ invariant to the nature of the evidence on which the decider’s perception is based.”
Id.
105 “[P]otential outcomes for any unit of an experiment are independent of the treatment assignment
of any other unit or population member under study.” Robert J. Sampson, Gold Standard Myths:
Observations on the Experimental Turn in Quantitative Criminology, 26 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 489,
492 (2010).
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The statistician’s solution also means that the decision about when the
treatment is conceptualized to occur is enormously important for deciding
what variables are posttreatment and thus should not be controlled for or
balanced on in the analysis. 106 For example, consider Judge Schroeder’s
objections to the Government’s expert Dr. John MacDonald in the Johnson
case, who analyzed 20,059 traffic stop forms filled out by deputies in the
Alamance County Sherriff’s Office. Dr. MacDonald attempted to estimate
the “effect of being Latino” on post-stop outcomes, such as warnings,
citations, or arrests, by estimating a series of logistic regressions that
included all available control variables, which were limited in the
administrative data. 107 Judge Schroeder found this evidence unsatisfactory
because he believed the analysis did not compare sufficiently similarly
situated Latino and non-Latino drivers, because Dr. MacDonald did not
include a host of conceivable control variables—such as personal affect in
response to the police—that would only be observable post-stop. 108
Controlling for differences among drivers that officers learn after making the
initial stop is problematic under the Greiner–Rubin framework because they
are potentially infected by the treatment, including even perhaps recording
of seemingly objective differences like prior criminal record or furtive
actions because it could enter as a post hoc justification of discriminatory
treatment. 109
106

This, as I argue extensively below, is my point that the process of selecting a method for detecting
discrimination is not merely a methodological question with normative overtones. It is the process of
defining the concept, which is at once descriptive about the world and evaluative.
107 According to the court, the forms contained the following information:
the initial reason for the traffic stop; vehicle driver information (including the driver’s race and
ethnicity but not name); the enforcement action taken as a result of the stop (specifically, whether
an officer issued a citation, made an arrest, issued a verbal or written warning, or made no
enforcement action); whether the officer performed a search during the stop; the type of search
(i.e., whether the search was based on probable cause, consented to, based on a search warrant,
incident to arrest, or a protective frisk); whether a passenger was searched; and whether the officer
found “contraband” (e.g., illegal drugs or weapons).
United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 308 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
108 “Without controlling for these obvious, nondiscriminatory reasons for post-stop outcomes, Dr.
MacDonald’s statistical evidence does not prove dissimilar treatment between Hispanics and similarly
situated non-Hispanics as to stop outcome.” Id. at 363. The court was particularly concerned with the
absence of variables measuring the “severity of the conduct” and reasons for enforcement action, saying,
Dr. MacDonald’s analysis requires the court to assume two major propositions: (1) similarity in
generic stop reason means similarity in the severity of the conduct resulting in the stop; and (2)
the stop reason (which Dr. MacDonald does not purport to measure) equates causally with the
reason for the stop outcome (which he claims to measure).
Id. at 361–62.
109 Thus, even on the terms of the model, there is a substantial number of important police and
prosecutorial decisions (such as patrol allocation by neighborhood, or subjective assessment of severity
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The point of the Greiner–Rubin solution is to circumscribe the
encounter of interest to a discrete set of events at and after the decisionmaker’s encounter with a candidate unit and ask how the perceived raced
status of a unit affects the decision-maker in that discrete encounter. The
substantive upshot of the statistician’s solution is that it operationalizes a
definition of discrimination that necessarily excludes any historical effects
of how race has structured units to be systematically different on relevant
variables prior to the encounter. 110 The statistician’s solution addresses the
manipulability and temporality objections to conceptualizing race as a
treatment. The solution also vindicates the intuition that detecting
discrimination in a particular arena is not about seeking to hold a discrete
decision-maker liable for the entire accumulated disadvantage between
different groups defined by race or ethnicity. Rather, it is about holding a
decision-maker liable for how race affected the outcome of interest in a
particular discrete encounter over which she has control.
Solved!
C. Is Race a Treatment? The Sociologist’s Objection
Not so fast.
Let me point out something about the statistician’s solution to his
eponymous objection. In the counterfactual framework, the sentence “A
causes B” means “the effect of A is B.” 111 The framework definitionally
restricts the class of eligible causes to “things that could, in principle, be
treatments in experiments,” because the framework is erected to give precise
operational meaning to causal statements by measuring the effects of known
causes, not the causes of observed effects.112 As I have mentioned, the Rubian
objection is often presented in terms of nonmanipulability: the fact that units
are not potentially exposable to being raced differently at the time of the
relevant encounter. But physical, logistical, ethical, or practical human
limitations to bringing about a treatment are not fatal flaws in considering

of conduct) that are not susceptible to a study design that could exclude post-racial/ethnic perception
variables, because those variables are precisely the ones that would make the units similarly situated.
110 Greiner and Rubin state, “Much here depends on a willingness to exonerate the decider from
responsibility for prior events.” Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 777. I do see how even the
paradigmatic form of invidious, or what economists call “taste-based,” discrimination do not also hold
decision-makers responsible for prior events, namely development of invidious tastes that were learned
and inherited from a history and culture that has constructed particular groups as disfavored and excluded.
111 Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference: Rejoinder, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 968, 968–
70 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
112 Holland, supra note 13, at 954.
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something a cause in the counterfactual model. 113 As long as it is logically
and conceptually possible to talk about administering a process on a unit that
brings about the proffered treated state—while still retaining the unit as the
same unit—then the proffered treatment can be labeled a cause in the
counterfactual framework. The Greiner–Rubin solution is trying to figure out
a way that race can be analyzed as a cause within the counterfactual
framework, so they switch the unit of causal inference to the decision-maker
to address the manipulability and temporality of treatment issues accordingly
and identify perceived race as the treatment. Here is where I want to
introduce the sociological spin on the Rubian statistician’s objection to
talking about race as a cause in the counterfactual framework. The problem
with talking about race as a cause-qua-treatment is not a problem with
practical manipulability; it is a problem with the sociological and normative
meaning of the proffered manipulation.
Race is a fundamental structuring institution of life chances in the
United States. Inhabiting a particular racial category not only shapes the
opportunities, advantages, and resources that will be available in a person’s
life course, it means living with a particular cultural meaning attached to
one’s body. It is not meaningful to talk about an otherwise identical person
suddenly swapping racial status at the time of a given encounter because the
raced status a person has inhabited since birth has shaped so many aspects of
the person relevant to the encounter that it is impossible to disentangle those
factors from the person’s raced status.
There is no nonbacktracking way to specify the hypothetical “treatment
of race” on a person (or aggregation) at a given moment to measure its effect
on an outcome of interest (much like there is no nonbacktracking way to
specify the effect of a Clinton, as opposed to Trump, inauguration on D.C.
Metro ridership). If so many aspects of life are structured by ascribed racial
status—from prenatal medical care, to residential patterns, to educational
opportunities, to end-of-life palliative treatment—then it is nonsensical to
ask of a person (or aggregate units like neighborhoods) to change
his/her/their raced status, but otherwise be the exact same person (or
113 As Heckman pointed out, we should not confuse practical problems for theoretical problems:
“Holland’s 1986 claim that the causal effects of race or gender are meaningless conflates an empirical
problem”—identifying parameters (causal or otherwise) from hypothetical population data—“with a
problem of theory”—defining the set of hypotheticals or counterfactuals; “[t]he scientific approach
sharply distinguishes these two issues. One can in theory define the effect even if one cannot identify it
from population or sample data.” James J. Heckman, The Scientific Model of Causality, 35 SOC.
METHODOLOGY 1, 31–32 (2005); see also Clark Glymour, Comment: Statistics and Metaphysics, 81 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 964, 964–66 (1986); Clark Glymour & Madelyn R. Glymour, Commentary: Race and
Sex Are Causes, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 488, 489 (2014) (discussing conditions under which race and sex can
be conceptualized as causes in a framework limiting the label to interventions or events on the unit).
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neighborhood). It is impossible (that is, illogical, nonsensical, improbable,
meaningless) to ask of the person: Be the exact same unit except for race,
but do not change anything else about yourself because I want to see the
effect of race and race alone on an outcome (Y).
But the thrust of the Greiner–Rubin solution is to posit this as a
possibility in the minds of decision-makers. That is, the statistician’s solution
requires decision-makers’ consideration of candidate units that are the exact
same units except for race, asking that those units not change anything else
about themselves except that one attribute so that we might isolate the effect
of race and race alone on the decision-makers’ assignment of an outcome
(Y). This solution requires us to accept that there is such a thing in potential
decision-makers’ minds as unit u that is “treated” by being raced “black” that
is conceptually an identical unit when raced “white,” except for that single
trait. That is the narrow and precise definition of cause in the counterfactual
model. Something cannot be a causal predicate in the counterfactual
framework if
we cannot coherently describe what it would be like for the relevant intervention
to occur at all or for which there is no conceivable basis for assessing claims
about what would happen under such interventions because we have no basis
for disentangling, even conceptually, the effects of changing the cause variable
alone from the effects of other sorts of changes that accompany changes in the
cause variable. 114

What sort of thing is “race” under the thought experiment that imagines
decision-makers could perceive identical units that differ only in the
treatment of racial status? 115 I submit the only way to get that thought

114 WOODWARD, supra note 95, at 132. As I will argue below, this issue is fatal for any attempt to
identify discrimination with the treatment effect of race because we require sociological knowledge of
what sorts of things have different cultural or social meanings by group status despite being formally
identical, and we require a moral theory for what sorts of things are fair or just to vary given the prior.
115 A recent paper by Sen and Wasow suggests that the problems of causal inference with respect to
race can be fruitfully addressed by conceptualizing race as a “bundle of sticks,” which would be
“operationalized as a disaggregable composite variable rather than a monolithic, homogenous entity,
[and] the problem of manipulability can be resolved by identifying an element of race that is [both]
relevant to the research question at hand and [that] can be manipulated in at least one of two ways,” either
by selecting auditors “from different racial categories,” or by changing “traits that are highly collinear
with race and mutable [which] are often well suited to causal inference” such as name, neighborhood, or
dialect. Sen & Wasow, supra note 97, at 506–08. They argue this “approach resolves the conflict between
the potential outcomes framework of causal inference and seemingly immutable characteristics such as
race, gender and sexual orientation.” Id. at 500–01. VanderWeele and Robinson, supra note 93, at 477,
suggest a related way of interpreting the race coefficient in a proffered analysis that would regress some
measure of, say, health outcomes on socioeconomic status (SES) and race, saying that

the coefficient for black race in the regression could be interpreted as the health inequality that
would remain between blacks and whites if the family and neighborhood SES distributions . . . of
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experiment off the ground is to conceptualize race as only a signifier stripped
of all of its accreted meanings, as something like freckles or bunions that is
just the bodily property. On this account, race is an individual-level physical
attribute, and decision-makers have the capacity to identify the treatment of
racial status by perceiving the attribute without triggering the social
meanings (as opposed to mere affectual distaste) that make it a culturally
salient category (in contrast to freckles, which can be identified by
designating small dots on a person’s face without deeper relevant cultural
literacy). My claim is that such an account of race as a treatment is
incompatible with the constructivist account of race because race is a system
of social meanings, not an individual-level attribute. 116
An analogy to other things that are not profitably conceptualized as
treatments in the counterfactual framework might be helpful. Imagine one
wants to understand how the treatment of GERMAN versus URUGUAY on the
units of nation-states affects some outcome Y measurable at the level of the
nation-state. What does it mean to think of types of COUNTRINESS as causes
in the counterfactual sense? How does one pick out that thing that is
distinctly THE-TREATMENT and separate it from the set of things that can
conceptually be identified as NOT-THE-TREATMENT? How would one isolate
GERMAN versus URUGUAY from its confounders, by stripping away history,
institutional structure, culture, language, and so much more to get to the core
of GERMANNESS or URUGUAYNESS? Such a thought experiment takes us
away from the real social entities that we are trying to understand and seems
to misrepresent the way that country-specificity has causal properties. One
could create typologies of nation-states and formalize certain qualitative
differences and similarities among them to understand why Y levels work
out differently in different clusters of, say, resource endowments, political
histories, or institutional configurations. But that is a very different exercise
from isolating the causal effect of COUNTRINESS, which requires that there
be such a thing as COUNTRINESS that is distinct and apart from NONCOUNTRINESS and the latter needs to be stripped away to get at the core
the black population were set equal to that of the white population (e.g., by setting SES for each
black person to levels randomly chosen from the white SES distribution).
The bundle of sticks metaphor suggests that the causal properties of the constituted category would remain
invariant to individual manipulations to its constitutive elements; but if the category has the meaning and
causal properties it has because of its constitutive parts and their organization, then such an assumption
would not hold. The theoretical objection to the VanderWeele and Robinson approach is similar: Why
would we assume that the relationship between health outcomes and the social categories of BLACK and
WHITE would be the same in a world in which family and neighborhood SES distributions were radically
changed from what they are in our current world?
116 Another way of thinking about the objection is that we need a theory of what constitutes THETREATMENT in order to separate it from things that are NOT-THE-TREATMENT.
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treatment so we can construct otherwise identical units that differ only
between GERMANNESS and URUGUAYNESS, but nothing else. Certainly, one
can proffer GERMANNESS or URUGUAYNESS as an explanans for the
explanandum of variation in Y, but I would assert that when we do so we are
similarly offering a constitutive explanation—referencing the things of
which the nation-states of Germany and Uruguay consist to explicate why
such a constellation make it possible for Y to vary in the way it does.
Decision-makers do not perceive neutral units as bearers of credentials
or decision-relevant variables that are then painted over with a racial status
any more than they perceive nation-states as neutral units of political
territory painted over with flavors of countriness. If we accept that race is
such a salient vector of social life that it is incoherent to conceptualize the
causal effect of race by asking a person to be the exact same person but for
race at a particular moment in time, then it is similarly incoherent to
conceptualize the causal effect of race by imagining decision-makers to
perceive two candidates as otherwise identical but for race for similar
reasons. The catch in the thought experiment is not biology making race
“immutable,” but history, economics, and sociology making race a
fundamental structuring category of thought, perception, action, and
experience in the United States.
Of course, we can present decision-makers with candidates of varied
racial statuses that look similarly situated with respect to formal credentials.
We can even present decision-makers with two candidates defined by vectors
of qualifications that represent an exhaustive list of every possible variable
that could conceivably be rationally relevant to the decision in question, but
that differ by racial signifiers.
What sort of information is generated by such an exercise and how does
it help us identify discrimination? I begin, naturally, with Eddie Murphy.
IV. EDDIE MURPHY AND THE EXPERIMENTAL IDEAL
In 1984, Eddie Murphy pioneered the field of audit studies, and
researchers have been trying to replicate his genius ever since. 117 After
applying white face makeup, watching a lot of Dynasty, and reading copious
Hallmark cards, Eddie Murphy emerged in New York City as Mr. White. In
his new racial identity, Murphy-as-White was gifted a free newspaper in a
bodega, treated to a musical drinking party on a public bus after the last black
117 Just kidding—there were audit studies prior to 1984 (for example, the classic correspondence
study: Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133,
134 (1962)). However, there is no question that none have matched the genius of that 1984 Saturday
Night Live skit “White Like Me.” NBC.COM, Watch Saturday Night Live Highlight: White Like Me,
http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/white-like-me/n9308 [https://perma.cc/VTF7-WBQD].
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man disembarked, and—with no collateral, no credit, and no ID—
effortlessly procured a loan of $50,000 from a bank with assurances from the
white banker that he did not really need to pay it back.
The classic audit study design mixes the randomization of clinical
experimental design with real-world conditions by staging randomized
encounters to generate the outcome of interest from actual decision-makers
in the field. 118 One often hears the claim that randomized experiments are the
“gold standard” for causal inference because randomization eliminates
selection-into-treatment bias. The strength of randomized studies is internal
validity, which refers to the confidence one can have in the estimate of the
treatment effect within the sample studied. But their weakness is external
validity, which refers to the confidence one can have that the treatment effect
estimated from the study sample can be extrapolated to the general
population of interest. It requires strong assumptions to infer that the
treatment effect estimated from a controlled randomized study generalizes to
the larger population. 119 In audit studies, the researcher tries to select auditors
that are as closely matched as possible on relevant dimensions and differ
only by race (or ethnicity, sex, etc.), who are then trained to go into a
particular encounter in an identical fashion to solicit the decision-makers’
reactions to specific prompts. Correspondence studies mimic this design
without live testers by using identical résumés or applications to solicit the
decision-makers’ outcome and signaling the category of difference (race,
ethnicity, sex) either explicitly or implicitly.
For example, Devah Pager’s well-known study of race and criminal
record discrimination—first conducted in Milwaukee and replicated in New
York City—was designed to present employers with similarly qualified job
applicants who differed by race and felony drug conviction. The Milwaukee
study enrolled college students as auditors, who were “matched on the basis
of age, race, physical appearance, and general style of self-presentation” and
were also assigned “fictitious résumés that reflected equivalent levels of
education and work experience.” 120 In Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman’s
118 “While retaining the key experimental features of matching and random assignment important for
inferences of causality, this approach relies on real contexts (e.g., actual employment searches, real estate
markets, consumer transactions) for its staged measurement techniques.” DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:
RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 48–49 (2007).
119 See CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION AND DECISION 226–27 (2007). The
tension among the extent of assumptions, the confidence in the deduction, and the scope of applicability
of that deduction has been widely discussed. One notable formulation is Manski’s Law of Decreasing
Credibility: “The credibility of inference decreases with the strength of the assumptions maintained.” Id.
at 3. As he argues, “[t]his principle implies that empirical researchers face a dilemma as they decide what
assumptions to maintain. Stronger assumptions yield inferences that may be tighter but less credible.
Methodological research cannot resolve this dilemma but can clarify its nature.” Id.
120 See PAGER, supra note 118, at 59.
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classic study of discrimination in bargaining for new cars, the auditors were
chosen within a narrow age range (twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age),
education (three to four years of postsecondary education), attractiveness
(“testers were subjectively chosen to have average attractiveness”), wore
similar “yuppie” clothing, and “drove to the dealership in similar rented
cars.” 121 The auditors were also given careful training and instructions so that
they would approach the car dealers in the same way and systematically
bargain in the same manner; a “script governed both the verbal and nonverbal
behavior of the testers.” 122 Other well-known correspondence and audit
studies include in-person consultations and sending identical credentials on
résumés mailed to job openings with different racialized sounding names
(white-associated names such as Emily Walsh or Greg Baker, or AfricanAmerican-associated names such as Lakisha Washington or Jamal Jones). 123
One might think that the audit study is the methodological incarnation
of the statistician’s solution of conceptualizing race as a cause-quatreatment. The object of causal inference is the decision-maker; the
researcher can design auditors to present a set of identical credentials; and
the treatment signals the racial status of candidates. At the risk of being
repetitive, audit studies are important and valuable. But they are not a clean
methodological solution to messy questions about what racial discrimination
is and how we ought to detect it.
The following Sections make three related conceptual points. First,
audit studies do not measure the objectively bounded treatment effect of race
and race alone, stripped of all other confounding traits, meanings,
characteristics, or variables, on decision-makers’ determinations of an
outcome of interest. Second, the results of audit studies are recognizable as
evidence of discrimination by virtue of constitutive explanations that ground
thick ethical evaluations. It is not because the study design has isolated the
treatment effect of race (or ethnicity, or sex, etc.), but because the design
instantiates moral intuitions that—given what the different social categories
are—members of the respective groups ought to elicit the same outcomes
121 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305–06 (1995).
122 Id. at 306.
123 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991
(2004); Judith D. Feins & Rachel G. Bratt, Barred in Boston: Racial Discrimination in Housing, 49 J.
AM. PLANNING ASS’N 344 (1983); Stephen L. Ross, Appendix A: Paired Testing and the 2000 Housing
Discrimination Survey, in ANGELA WILLIAMS FOSTER ET AL., MEASURING HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
IN
A
NATIONAL
STUDY:
REPORT
OF
A
WORKSHOP
49,
49–66
(2002),
https://www.nap.edu/read/10311/chapter/9 [https://perma.cc/ZRA4-LN4U]; John Yinger, Evidence on
Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 33 (1998); John Yinger, Measuring Racial
Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881, 883 (1986).
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when they present in the manner in which the study manufactures. The
results are often recognized as such compelling evidence because study
design frequently instantiates widely held—yet often quite minimal—moral
intuitions about how groups ought to be treated given what differences and
meanings constitute their status. Third, semi-experimental (or experimental
for that matter) methods are not the “gold standard” for detecting
discrimination against which all other means should be measured. In the
context of certain forms of discrimination, these methods might often be
inappropriate.
A. Solid State Race
Audit studies do not measure the objective-isolated treatment effect of
race and race alone. This is not because researchers have failed to design and
execute the methodology with rigor or precision. Audit studies do not
measure the objective-isolated treatment effect of race and race alone
because there is no such thing to measure.
If one accepts the constructivist account of race, then the signifiers used
to signal treatment into a racial category for auditors inflect the very
meanings and substantive relevance of other decision-relevant credentials
because that’s what race is: it is a system of social meaning wherein
particular cultural cues indicate the stratifying social types operative in a
particular place and time. The constructivist would insist that the treatment
presented in audit and correspondence studies is not substantively identical
candidates that differ only by racial status, but rather differently raced
candidates bearing whatever set of formally similar credentials the
researcher gives them. Before further explaining what I take audit studies to
be detecting, I want to make a few points about what audit studies represent
by thinking through their actual design, execution, and interpretation.
First, there is no way to even design a study attempting to present
decision-makers with similarly situated candidates that differ by race without
thick cultural knowledge about the social meaning of traits and credentials
in a particular place and time, or without making substantive value
judgments about the fair grounds for decision-making in a particular arena
given our knowledge of how these categories are constituted. Second,
presenting decision-makers with candidates signaling different racial status
and an identical set of credentials does not mean that decision-makers
perceive identical units but for the treatment if the very meanings of the
credentials are inflected by the racial status. These credentials do not
necessarily mean the same thing for purposes of interpreting an action as
discriminatory just because they are identically proffered. That is, if the
social categories of race and ethnicity are constituted by systematic
1210
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differentiation over some set of important social, economic, and cultural
factors, then signaling different membership changes the meaning of other
decision-relevant traits or credentials.
Most audit studies proceed by trying to make all factors about the
auditors that might be theoretically relevant to the decision-maker’s decision
identical. Imagine that the ideal experiment would have an exhaustive list of
all credentials that would be instrumentally rational to consider in the
decision of interest. The researcher could then set those credentials to be the
same between the two candidate auditors selected to signal different raced
statuses. But the researcher cannot just use credentials to signal the relevant
variables if what she is trying to do is make candidates substantively identical
because formally identical credentials are interpreted differently with
differently raced candidates precisely because of the social fact of race.
For instance, say a researcher wants to signal equal educational
attainment of a black and white auditor. She could list a high school diploma
on the résumé for each auditor. But the history of racial segregation and state
neglect of black schools has created large differences in the mean quality of
schools between white and black neighborhoods in most major cities, so a
decision-maker might treat the high school diploma signal differently for a
black and white auditor based on this knowledge or presumption. Or is the
right way to set up a study design to have a black student with a high school
diploma from a well-known and predominantly white high school? Would
that design trigger the types of assumptions Justice Clarence Thomas
famously frets about with regard to affirmative action? 124 Or is the raceneutral way of proffering the credential for the high school diploma to be
from a racially integrated high school? What does that mean if only a tiny
percentage of the city’s schools are racially integrated or if education is
stratified within schools? Or should the researcher include the score of some
so-called skill or aptitude test? Is that a race-neutral way of signaling
capacity when the tests measure developed abilities, which systematically
differ by environments, the very environments that systematically differ by

124 Dissenting from the majority opinion upholding University of Michigan Law School’s
consideration of race in admissions, Justice Thomas argued:

As admission prospects approach certainty, there is no incentive for the black applicant to
continue to prepare for the LSAT once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score.
It is far from certain that the LSAT test-taker’s behavior is responsive to the Law School’s
admissions policies. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that this racial discrimination will help
fulfill the bigot’s prophecy about black underperformance—just as it confirms the conspiracy
theorist’s belief that “institutional racism” is at fault for every racial disparity in our society.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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race? 125 Even if the researcher arranges for all relevant observable factors to
look nominally equal, testers can vary on “unobservables,” those soft skills
or interactional tendencies that make people just seem different. 126 So, in
order to really accomplish substantive equality in all theoretically decisionrelevant variables between candidate units, the auditor must know (1) the
way in which the history and social practice of race structures access to
qualifications and credentials, and (2) the content of cultural stereotypes by
which racial status fills in meanings of various proxies of qualifications or
instrumentally rational variables.
The point is not that a researcher cannot make reasoned judgment calls
and defend them, though those defenses can only be advanced in sociological
and normative terms. The point is that there is no race-neutral way of
proffering credentials because we live in a racially stratified society. When
one tries to think about how to construct identical candidates that differ only
by race, one realizes it is a lot of work to strip away all of the NOT-THETREATMENT in order to get at the thing that is THE-TREATMENT because race
is such a fundamental structuring category of social life, thought, and
experience in America.
If one follows the logic of constructing substantively identical auditors
but for race all the way down, the exercise becomes one of experimentally
unmaking the social consequences of a racial order in a particular encounter.
But the map to unmake the consequences of entrenched racial systems can
only come from thick sociological and historical knowledge about how race
patterns life chances and creates meanings. It can only come from situated
social understanding about the complex system of meanings and practices
that constitutes the very categories. The ideal experiment to detect
discrimination in the counterfactual causal model is one in which the
researcher uses this map to select credentials that zero out the average
differences in relevant variables that were produced by the real lived
institutions of racial orders, and that signal to the decision-maker that the
assumptions or valuations she might assign to formal credentials drawing on

125 See Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 55, 55–
85 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (discussing the various forms of bias that are
implicated by relying on so-called aptitude tests, including labeling and content bias, which misattributes
the measurement object to purely innate intelligence instead of environmental factors supporting
development or uses measurement techniques that systematically favor one group, or prediction bias,
which refers to the fact that similar scores do not predict valued outcomes (i.e., grades, job performance)
similarly between groups because of other systematic differences).
126 James Heckman, among others, has long criticized audit studies for failing to consider the role of
different variances between groups on characteristics unobservable to the researcher but observable to
the potential decision-maker. See James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101,
108–11 (1998).
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cultural stereotypes are inapplicable to the given case. Remember: the
definition of a treatment in the counterfactual model requires an isolated
nonbacktracking manipulation on a unit that can be applied without
transforming the unit into a different unit. Unless the researcher is presenting
identical candidates but for the treatment in a given encounter, she is not
measuring the treatment effect of race alone on otherwise identical units. She
is doing something else.
And what have we gotten at after we have followed that map all the way
down in this ideal thought experiment of constructing substantively identical
auditors but for racial difference? My sense is the standard assumption is that
at base what you hit is the brute fact of racial difference, which must mean
the signifiers of racial status—e.g., “just” skin color, phenotype, or some
other physical difference between bodies—stripped of all of the effects they
produced in the social world prior to that encounter and bundled with a note
to the decision-maker that any of the negative (or positive) signified
meanings that have been attached to those signifiers are not true in this
instance. And my sense is that many people have understood the legal refrain
of “invidious discrimination” (or “taste-based discrimination”) to mean
precisely this—someone acting out of affectual distaste for the brute
signifiers of race.
But conceptualizing this as the ideal thought experiment for detecting
discrimination—looking for indications that a decision-maker has acted on
mere affectual distaste for the brute signifiers of race—unmoors the exercise
from both a sociologically coherent theory of race and an ethically sound
theory for why the coercive powers of the state should be dedicated to
detecting it and rooting it out. There is no public reason—worthy of
constitutional amendments, federal and state legislation, various
administrative agencies, and extensive public resources—to be concerned
with individual-level dislike of certain physical attributes unless we have a
theory about how social processes have constructed those signifiers as
systemically disfavored through persistent material and symbolic processes
and a theory about why that is wrong.
B. How Audit Studies Demonstrate Discrimination
In thinking through what audit studies are trying to get at, we need to
remember that there is a difference between discrimination and irrationality
or idiosyncratic tastes. Saying that a decision-maker undertook a course of
action because a candidate was perceived to be white means something
different than saying a decision-maker undertook a course of action because
a candidate was perceived to have freckles. The former references a social
category as the reason for action; the latter references speckles of melanin
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on the epidermis. When we say “Eddie Murphy got a free newspaper because
he was white,” “white” is essentially a metonym for a constellation of social
meanings produced through a complex history of slavery, immigration, and
countless other forces, not a melanin deficit (or white face makeup in his
case). 127 The signifiers of racial status cannot appear (to cultural insiders) as
random aspects of physicality like freckles, about which people might have
thin personal preferences or affectual responses. If signifiers of racial status
could appear to cultural insiders as random aspects of physicality, then it
would be quite mysterious why those markers of physicality predict other
valuable social and economic resources.128 And there certainly would be no
moral grounds, distinct from a commitment to functional rationality or
efficiency, to prohibit public and private actors from acting on their
preferences for certain signifiers of racial status.
For these reasons, I insist that racial discrimination is a thick ethical
concept that rests on an account of the system of social meanings that
constitute race and a normative theory for why (and when) decisions that are
based on those social meanings are worthy of moral concern. There is no
reason above and beyond opposition to idiosyncratic aversions, irrationality,
random meanness, or a general opposition to the structure of disadvantages
(as opposed to whom and how they are allocated) to care about a decisionmaker denying an opportunity or imposing a cost on a freckled candidate. 129
But there is a reason above and beyond opposition to idiosyncratic aversions,
irrationality, or a general opposition to the structure of disadvantages to care
about a decision-maker denying an opportunity or imposing a cost on a black
candidate. 130 I believe that the sociological facts that explain why race is
127

“Because the system of slavery was contingent on and conflated with racial identity, it became
crucial to be ‘white,’ to be identified as white, to have the property of being white. Whiteness was the
characteristic, the attribute, the property of free human beings.” Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (1993).
128 Without getting dragged into another large debate, I will say that the same critiques offered here
can be applied to “taste-based” discrimination, which defines discrimination as essentially a random
aversion or irrational prejudice that a person is willing to expend resources to indulge: “[I]f someone has
a ‘taste for discrimination,’ he must act as if he were willing to forfeit income in order to avoid certain
transactions . . . .” BECKER, supra note 28, at 16. A police officer may dislike people with freckles. And
he might even be motivated to make an otherwise marginal arrest because he hates people with freckles
so much. But having “preferences” for nonfreckled people is a fundamentally different sort of disposition
than a “preference” for nonblack people. A police officer can have thin preferences about freckles (just
hating the way they look), but not about the signifiers of blackness because those signifiers signify a much
deeper and wider set of social meanings.
129 See Post, supra note 30, at 15, 20 (discussing the trope of colorblindness in antidiscrimination
law as being an admonishment to be “instrumentally rational”).
130 I understand critiques of racialized liberalism to be making a similar point: that we cannot define
distributive justice as such without engaging how liberalism is itself premised on a racial order. See
MILLS, supra note 27, at 208–09.
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different from freckles are necessary to make sense of why the moral concern
with the signifiers of racial status being a source of disadvantage is distinct
from that of freckles. Essentially, the constructivist account of racial group
formation is the source for both: by identifying the historical and social
processes by which racial groups are constituted and maintained as
categories of stratification and domination, we identify the processes and
meanings we want to transform so that they no longer operate as categories
of stratification and domination.
Therefore, in my view, audit studies can provide evidence of
discrimination not by virtue of identifying a treatment effect, but by virtue
of providing evidence of a constitutive claim that grounds a thick ethical
evaluation. Furthermore, they are often recognized as providing strong
evidence of discrimination not because of clean methodological rigor, but
rather because of the widely shared moral intuitions—often quite minimal—
that are instantiated in most designs.
Let’s return to Eddie Murphy and his perfect audit study. He goes into
the bodega as Mr. White and gets the free newspaper. He goes in as black
Eddie Murphy and he is made to pay for the newspaper (let us assume other
things about his dress, speech, and affect are the same). The counterfactual
is true: Eddie Murphy not in whiteface and otherwise the same had to pay
for the newspaper. But that counterfactual is not what identifies the action as
discrimination.131 What identifies the bodega worker’s action as
discrimination is that we reason about its distinctive wrongfulness only by
referencing what constitutes BLACKNESS versus WHITENESS. We can only
characterize the action as distinctly discriminatory—as opposed to random,
irrational, or just an expression of idiosyncratic preferences of the bodega
worker—by relying on our prior social and cultural understandings about
what the categories of black and white are, what they mean, in what
meanings they consist, etc. The thick moral claim—the label of
DISCRIMINATION—is grounded in a constitutive explanation, answering
131 Certainly, there are many instances where someone might grant that the counterfactual is true but
think that the label of discrimination is not appropriate. Take, for example, the admissions policies at
issue for applicants in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, where the plaintiffs’ expert reasons
in explicit counterfactual terms that race “caused” a differential probability of admission.

An Asian-American applicant who was male, who was not disadvantaged, and whose
characteristics result in a 25% chance of admission would have more than a 36% chance of
admission if treated as a white applicant; more than a 75% chance of admission if treated as a
Hispanic applicant; and more than a 95% chance of admission if treated as an African-American
applicant (with all other characteristics unchanged).
Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 7, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, 2017 WL
10442564 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 14-cv-14176 ADB). Granting, for the purposes of argument, that there
is a differential likelihood of admission among groups conditional on some set of academic measures
does not answer the normative question of whether it identifies a discriminatory wrong.
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questions such as “In virtue of what about the categories of BLACKNESS and
WHITENESS can we understand this action to act on or rely upon that makes
us want to disavow it?” or “Did the dispositional properties of this social
category we know of as RACE make this act wrongful?”
The reason that most of us recognize results from audit studies showing
differential treatment by decision-makers of differently raced candidates is
because there is widespread agreement that differently raced persons with
the specific credentials presented in the study ought to be treated similarly,
not because proffering some discrete list of identical credentials or dress
somehow makes the candidates “identical persons” except for this trait called
“race.”
Consider another example concerning the category of sex: if we send
out a male and female auditor to apply for jobs carrying identical résumés
and dressed in identical skirts, they are not identical candidates but for sex.
They are differently sexed candidates (as signaled with recognizable cues for
culturally presumed SEX binaries) that have the same résumé wearing the
same skirt. The existence of the category SEX makes the same skirt mean
something different for purposes of deciding if differential treatment is
discriminatory; and we only know that because we have prior sociological
knowledge about what SEX references in this place and time. Whether or not
one interprets results showing a lower job-offer rate to the male auditorcandidate as evidence of sex discrimination in hiring turns on what one
thinks is fair to expect in workplaces given that the category of SEX in our
society currently is one in which differently sexed bodies with different
(presumed) primary or secondary sex characteristics are expected to wear
different types of attire. Furthermore, a position that we ought to recognize
a lower job-offer rate to the male auditor-candidate as discrimination would
be based on sociological and normative arguments advancing that, if we
change what sorts of attire differently sexed bodies are expected to wear in
workplaces, then we will transform the very meanings of sex in our society
to be categorically less capable of producing oppression and inequality. The
precondition to applying a thick ethical evaluation of discrimination to the
results of an audit study is a moral position on what people are owed given
what the category is, not some formal standard of equality that can be
articulated without understanding what race or sex is in this time and place.
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C. Gold Standards
As philosophers, criminologists, statisticians, and many others have
pointed out, there is no a priori gold standard method. 132 Methods must fit
questions. The selection of methods should be driven by careful and rigorous
thinking about precisely what type of question we are asking, and explicit
reckoning with a theoretical framework that specifies the social categories
and processes at work. Several aspects of police and prosecutorial
discrimination cases make audit studies an inappropriate gold standard,
including the conceptual problems explained in the prior Sections, the
complex organizational structures of police departments and prosecutors’
offices, and the problems of external validity. Similar issues could be raised
in other discrimination contexts, such as the complex organizational
structures of large corporations or universities.
First, the conduct alleged to be unlawful in most police or prosecutorial
discrimination cases cannot be analyzed at the individual level or even at a
single level of interaction. Police departments and prosecutors’ offices are
large and complex organizations. Massive racial or ethnic disparities of the
type alleged in Floyd or Johnson, 133 for example, are not the result of
individual-level racist dispositions of beat cops or line prosecutors. Or rather,
they are rarely explainable only by reference to individual-level racist
dispositions of beat cops or line prosecutors. Explaining those disparities
requires understanding how certain responses to problems and actions
become conceivable; how observed patterns of outcomes emerge from the
organizational hierarchy of the police department or prosecutor’s office; how
enforcement decisions are made; who issues directives; how internal rules
are enforced or not enforced; how incentives of different actors at various
levels of the organizational hierarchy are shaped; and how all of these factors
interact.
There are some 36,000 officers within the NYPD 134 allocated between
many hierarchical and vertical levels of the organization.135 Which level
would be the right unit to take as the decision-maker for purposes of
132

CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND DECISIONS 36–
38 (2013); Cartwright, supra note 101, at 11; Sampson, supra note 105, at 496.
133 See supra notes 63–66, 81, and accompanying text for an earlier discussion of Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and supra notes 1–6, 107 for an earlier discussion of
United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 308 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
134 About
NYPD,
NYPD,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypdlanding.page [https://perma.cc/8KNY-PNRH].
135 Bureaus, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/bureaus.page [https://perma.cc/
NW2J-4L73] (listing twenty-two of the organization’s bureaus and explaining that “[e]ach bureau is
headed by a chief or deputy commissioner who is appointed by the Police Commissioner and oversees
the numerous functions of his or her divisions, units, and squads”).
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detecting discrimination in the counterfactual model? The plaintiffs in the
Floyd case did not set out to show that the hundreds of thousands of stops of
black and Latino residents resulted from the psychological dispositions of
beat cops. Some of the plaintiffs’ most compelling evidence was about the
multifaceted interactions among various levels of the organization, such as
how allocation decisions were made, how stop-and-frisk numbers were used
as a performance metric for both beat cops and precinct commanders, and
the pressures created at different levels of the organization to demonstrate
productivity. The outcomes at issue in the Floyd case were produced by the
complex interaction of allocation decisions, tactical decisions, incentives and
directives at various levels of the organization, and beliefs and intentions at
various levels of the hierarchy. Looking for racial discrimination as the
treatment effect of race on discrete decision-making units at a single level of
activity would be a deeply theoretically misguided way to determine whether
outcomes that are produced in an interactive fashion through many layers of
organizational directives, incentives, and discretion are discriminatory.
Police allocation decisions, for example, can never be modeled in the
way suggested by the statistician’s solution. If a court wants to know if race
“caused”—in the counterfactual sense—more police to be allocated to a
certain neighborhood, a sting operation to be sited in a particular community,
or prosecutors to choose specific confidential informants (CIs) to make new
conspiracy cases, it is impossible to do so utilizing the Greiner–Rubin
solution. There is no time at which we could imagine the relevant decisionmakers not perceiving the racial composition of the neighborhood,
community, or the race or ethnicity of their CIs. Actors in the organizational
hierarchy making tactical and allocation decisions are always doing so with
full knowledge of the racial compositions of the geographic spaces to which
they are allocating officers and directing specific tactics. In addition, in many
jurisdictions the history of racial and ethnic segregation makes it impossible
to find counterfactual units comparable along relevant vectors.136 We are
back to problems posed by the temporality of treatment issue discussed in
Part II because all relevant decisions are posttreatment. Nor are perceptions
136 Even perception of seemingly objective conditions like physical disorder are fundamentally
structured by racial and ethnic understandings, meaning it is not clear what exactly it would mean to say
two racially distinct neighborhoods are identical except for demographic composition. See Robert J.
Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social
Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (showing that “social structure,”
namely racial composition, “proved a more powerful predictor of perceived disorder than did carefully
observed disorder”). Furthermore, a city might have a few integrated neighborhoods or police precincts,
but often the majority of the outcomes of concern are happening in segregated spaces. Therefore, taking
integrated spaces as the benchmark for nondiscriminatory outcomes is deeply problematic because it
assumes raced units will be treated the same in homogenous and heterogeneous spaces.
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of crime conditions—even devoid of any explicit race descriptors—“raceneutral” input; the very conception of what sorts of social problems are
assigned to the penal arm of the state is itself deeply racialized, and
seemingly neutral designations transmit racial meaning. 137
Finally, the very strengths of methods with strong internal validity are
weaknesses when trying to generalize the relevance of the findings beyond
the controlled parameters of the study design. Randomized clinical trials, for
example—the method typically touted as the gold standard for making causal
inferences of the counterfactual variety—provide strong evidence of very
narrow claims. 138 The reliability of the conclusions of audit studies is
similarly dependent upon the ability of the researcher to practically realize
all of the requirements laid out in Part III, which in extremely simple terms
demand that the candidate units have been made exactly the same but for the
designated treatment. But a court evaluating an allegation of police or
prosecutorial discrimination is not just concerned with internal validity,
whether the treatment effect estimated is biased for the study population. A
court must also be concerned with external validity, such as whether the
causal claims supported by the study are generalizable to larger populations.
For all of the “vanity of rigor” in randomized experiments, we find ourselves
right back in the sloppy terrain of expert judgment, past experience, and
reasoned qualitative discussion to decide if and to what extent the study’s
findings are representative of the causal structure in the larger world that is
the object of our true concern. 139
Beyond internal and external validity issues, courts also must ask if the
information generated, even if generalizable, actually captures what is at
issue in a claim of police discrimination. Scholars addressing the relevance
of experimental data for policy debates have used the phrase “policy
transfer” or “contextualization” to capture the fact that narrow causal claims
137

For compelling historical documentation of how crime rates themselves were racialized from the
start, see KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011), and for compelling psychological evidence of how the
concept of crime triggers associations with the concept of blackness, see Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al.,
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. 876, 881 (2004)
(showing “the extent to which Black faces are brought before the footlights of attention when the concept
of crime is activated”).
138 [I]f all the assumptions for their correct application are met, then if evidence claims of the
appropriate form are true, so too will the conclusions be true. But these methods are concomitantly
narrow in scope. The assumptions necessary for their successful application will have to be
extremely restrictive and they can take only a very specialized type of evidence as input and
special forms of conclusion as output. That is because it takes strong premises to deduce
interesting conclusions and strong premises tend not to be widely true.

Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12.
139 Id. at 18.
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are not directly translatable to larger policy questions. 140 This is true not only
because causal effects might differ by subpopulations, but also because
treatments—especially scaled-up, systemwide treatments—can alter the
very context in which they are applied by transforming how strategic,
reflexive actors and institutions interact. 141
In sum, we should be careful not to let the apparent rigor and cleanliness
of certain methods drive the substance of what questions are asked. There is
no a priori reason that every question about the social world must fit into
variable-based analysis or experimental logic, and sometimes we do violence
to the inquiry at hand by forcing it to conform to the structure of favored
methods that might seem like the most elegant abstraction (or the highest
status methods). At issue in many discrimination cases is how large,
complex, multilayered, and sometimes heterogeneous organizations have
operated over extended periods of time and space. Audit studies, or
regression analyses trying to reconstruct similarly situated units, might
provide very valuable evidence of discrimination. But they certainly cannot
“clinch” the conclusion that the suspect outcomes resulting from complex
interactive mechanisms are or are not discrimination. 142
A final concern is a sociology-of-knowledge point. There is no question
that quantitative evidence has an exalted position in the hierarchy of
knowledge production because the methods are apparently value-free and
rigorously deductive (and perhaps also because the field is dominated by
men). Using and interpreting quantitative methods requires a measure of
expert training, and therefore, the validity of the conclusions from the
140 Sampson, supra note 105, at 494. Another pithy way of saying it is that “a policy is not a
treatment.” Robert J. Sampson, Christopher Winship & Carly Knight, Translating Causal Claims:
Principles and Strategies for Policy-Relevant Criminology, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 587, 591
(2013). Specifically,

to recommend policy requires more than considering how a treatment would be expected to work
across diverse locales. When one considers policy not as a randomized trial but as a change in
institutional structure, it becomes clear that theory must be brought to bear for prediction. A policy
is, by definition, a change in the rules of the game. As a result, “policy translation” involves both
the problem of what happens when [a treatment is administered] and the problem of accounting
for changes in organizational, political, or wider social structure when the treatment . . . scales up
into official policy.
Id.; see also James J. Heckman, Econometric Causality, 76 INT’L STAT. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (noting that a
key question for social scientists is “[f]orecasting the impacts of interventions (constructing
counterfactual states associated with interventions) never historically experienced to various
environments, including their impacts in terms of well-being”).
141 Sampson et al., supra note 140, at 600 (“[C]ontext implies more than an unarticulated background
or boundary against which to generalize causes and effects. To contextualize is to consider an entrenched
causal web that intervenes and shapes every point of an unfolding causal process, dictating the nature of
incentives, opportunities, and institutional relationships that define the policy world.”).
142 See Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12.
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methods is hard to dispute without technical expertise. So, one final
cautionary point is that discrimination cases should not become dominated
by experts fighting in methodological terms inaccessible to other actors; with
superior intelligence, computers, and fancy math in the form of equations
that look like Charlie Brown cursing, experts and only experts can detect
some force field of discrimination inaccessible to the uninitiated. At issue in
discrimination cases is always a theory of the relevant social categories and
a theory of fairness—both of which require engagement with social and
ethical matters—which can become obscured behind apparently
methodological discourse.
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Bertrand Russell famously admonished philosophy to abandon the
notion of causality, alleging that it survives, “like the monarchy, only
because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.” 143 Nancy Cartwright
responds that causal notions are essential to differentiate between effective
and ineffective strategies. 144 In the context of police and prosecutorial
actions, we often observe an association between negative policing or case
outcomes and the raced status of individuals or aggregations like
neighborhoods. But in order to know what is to be done about these
associations, we must inquire into causal relationships.
The question of detecting discrimination could be posed in terms of
effective strategies—What sort of causal understanding helps us to know if
the practices at issue in a discrimination case should be changed?
Conceptualizing race as treatment does not help us distinguish between
effective and ineffective strategies for dismantling discrimination because it
essentially asks what the effects of a racial signifier would be if the social
facts of race were not what they are today in the United States.
The ideal thought experiment that captures the treatment effect of race
and race alone asks the following: produce for the decision-maker’s
consideration two units with identical credentials (What if the entrenched
systems of racial stratification were not so?) and purge the racialized
meanings that inflect different values to similar credentials or attributes
(What if racial identification did not actually change the way decisionmakers perceived or evaluated formally similar things about individuals or
neighborhoods?). The question is, Does information about a causal link of
that variety pick out practices that the Constitution prohibits? I say no

143
144

Bertrand Russell, On the Notion of Cause, 13 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 1 (1912).
Nancy Cartwright, Causal Laws and Effective Strategies, 13 NOÛS 419, 420 (1979).
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because that thought experiment would produce information about a
particular decision-maker’s idiosyncratic distaste for floating signifiers.
I contend that the familiar refrain that defines discrimination as an
action or practice that happens “because of race” does not identify a relation
of counterfactual causality. Instead, it identifies a constitutive relation that
grounds a thick moral evaluation, which means we can only identify the
distinctive wrongfulness of the action or practice by reference to what social
types such as BLACK, HISPANIC, or WHITE culturally reference, in what it
consists to name someone such a type, and other ways of identifying what
the categories are.
To illustrate how constitutive, and not counterfactual causal,
explanations are at work in identifying discrimination, let us return to the
visiting anthropologist on the island nation stratified by Royals and nonRoyals. Asking about counterfactual causal dependence is just an unhelpful
way of figuring out whether stepping off the street when Royals approach is
properly described by a thick ethical term such as “non-Royal debasement.”
And it is an equally unhelpful way of identifying effective strategies, namely
what needs to be changed in order to dismantle Royal-based stratification.
We can address those questions with constitutive explanations. One
would need to ask how it is possible for non-Royals to feel compelled to step
off the sidewalk by reference to the constitutive aspects of the socially
constructed category Royal, namely by detailing the structure and content of
the social meanings and relations that make the category what-it-is. One
would have to ask if the fact of non-Royals deferring sidewalk access is
conceptually or logically dependent on the very structure of the social kind
Royal as it currently exists. Said yet another way, if a researcher were able
to make a person on the street of this society perceive two identical walkers
but for purple-cape-wearing and stick-carrying—and significant other
meanings about this person’s actions, credentials, or behavior were left
unaffected by this manipulation—then there would not be such a thing as
ROYAL in the way this society currently knows it. There would not be a
morally salient issue called “non-Royal debasement” to be addressed.
The constitutive explanation grounds the thick ethical evaluation of the
act. To interpret the act of stepping off the sidewalk as non-Royal
debasement (or conversely, respectful Royal obedience)—as opposed to a
spontaneous adjustment to scarce sidewalk space or expression of a
preference for road-walking—we need access to sociological and
anthropological knowledge about what constitutes the relevant social kinds
in this society. And describing it as non-Royal debasement (or conversely,
respectful royal obedience) is not merely disapproving or approving of the
act. It is invoking a thick ethical concept, which simultaneously describes,
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with textured, system-level information, and evaluates the object to which it
is applied. These two facets cannot be separated because the evaluative
aspect—the expression of judgment about the act—can only be activated
using the descriptive component—the constellation of situated social
meanings and cultural constructs referenced by the concept. 145
We can describe something as discrimination only if it implicates social
meanings in a way that constitutes some social kinds as degraded or
disfavored, over many domains and times. Race does not have effects in the
world by triggering mere affectual dislike for random physical signifiers. In
fact, I contend that our culture’s signifiers of racial groups are just not
available to be the objects of thin preferences (or “tastes”) the way that other
aspects of physicality would be, such as freckles or bunions, because of the
history of racial group construction. And that same process that constructed
racial categories explains why so many people seem to have the same
affectual response to the same signifiers—why racial discrimination is a
pervasive practice in many domains in the way that freckle or bunion
discrimination is not.
We can still seek to detect discrimination using audit studies, regression
techniques with observational data, and many of the same methods folks
have long used in social science and legal challenges. But we should be very
clear what we are doing with those methods. The argument I have advanced
in the preceding 29,807 words is that what we are not doing with those
methods is detecting the treatment effect of race in the counterfactual causal
sense.
Other careful thinkers committed to the counterfactual causal definition
of discrimination have thoughtfully engaged questions regarding the design
and interpretation of quantitative measures of discrimination, arguing that
researchers ought to be both reflective and explicit about which variables are
included and excluded when trying to isolate the causal effect of race. 146 But
central to all counterfactual causal accounts of racial discrimination is the
notion that there is a solid state race in units (individuals, neighborhoods,
145 The valuation is fundamentally structured by and premised upon a socially and culturally
conditioned set of understandings. Thus, the normative component is only accessible to those with the
linguistic and cultural competencies to decode the factual descriptive component in its social context.
Abend, supra note 21, at 148.
146 Starr, supra note 99, at 32–33; Greiner & Rubin, supra note 97, at 775. Ian Ayres and Jonathan
Borowsky criticize the inclusion of individual police officer characteristics as an illegitimate explanation
for racial disparities in policing and warn of “included variable bias.” IAN AYRES & JONATHAN
BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
13 (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/racial-profiling-lapd-study-racially-disparate-outcomes-losangeles-police-department [https://perma.cc/R5XU-2EMQ] (report prepared for ACLU of Southern
California).
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etc.), an objective fact about the units that can be isolated after stripping away
all confounders. For something to be a treatment, there must be a way to pick
out what THE-TREATMENT is—distinct and apart from all of the things that
are NOT-THE-TREATMENT so that we are sure we are talking about identical
units that differ only on the-treatment. If we cannot pick apart THETREATMENT from NOT-THE-TREATMENT, then we are not estimating a
treatment effect of race and race alone when we compare the outcomes of
candidates with some list of similar credentials and signals for different
racial categories. We are doing something else.
I believe that what we are doing with both observational and audit
studies of discrimination is building a case, collecting evidence to support
that case, and otherwise “vouching” for a particular constitutive claim with
moral dimensions: that a specific action, practice, or policy is possible
because of the social fact of race (or ethnicity) in a manner that implicates
constitutive aspects of the category that we would like to change. 147 Because
racial discrimination is a thick ethical concept, the way we figure out if a
specific action, practice, or policy is possible because of the social fact of
race is inextricably intertwined with the grounds for the moral evaluation of
whether or not it ought to be tolerated. 148
An implication of my argument is that the disparate treatment versus
disparate impact binary, so central to so much of antidiscrimination law and
literature, is not a tenable distinction along the lines it has often been
advanced. We cannot define the former as an outcome caused by race (or
where race was a substantial motivating factor, or other “close enough”
formulations) and the latter as an outcome caused by a facially neutral
consideration that just happens to affect racial groups unequally.
I just do not see any difference between disparate impact and disparate
treatment that can be gotten at with value-free notions of counterfactual
causality, much less a distinction between classification on the basis of race
as such in contrast to race-neutral factors that just happen to produce
dissimilar racial impacts. Disparate treatment is often distinguished from
disparate impact with reference to intentional discrimination, but
147

Cartwright, supra note 101, at 12.

Methods [that vouch] are more wide-ranging but it cannot be proved that the conclusion is assured
by the evidence, either because the method cannot be laid out in a way that lends itself to such a
proof or because, by lights of the method itself, the evidence is symptomatic of the conclusion but
not sufficient for it.
Id.

148 Constitutive claims must also “support a counterfactual claim of necessity, namely that in the
absence of the structures to which we are appealing the properties in question would not exist. But the
kind of necessity required here is conceptual or logical, not causal or natural.” Alexander Wendt, On
Constitution and Causation in International Relations, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 101, 105–06 (1998).
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the explanandum (discrimination) in the explanans (discriminatory intent) is
not saved by reference to intent or motive (to discriminate) because the point
of the explanatory endeavor is to specify which sort of purposive
differentiating practices are discriminatory and which sort are permissible.
Furthermore, it is not clear why reliance on constitutive elements of a
category (black-boxing how we determine in what those consist) can be
coherently referenced as “race neutral” for purposes of deciding if use of
such element is discriminatory. Calling these “race neutral” is coherent if
one subscribes to a biological conception of race, in which the category
consists in sharing some genetic or biological facts (but, as argued
extensively above, then we have another problem, which is explaining why
we need to super-size scrutiny when the state classifies on the basis of those
facts). 149 But if one subscribes to the constructivist theory of race, one must
recognize some set of cultural performances, social practices, and institutions
that constitute the system of social meanings of the racial or ethnic category.
If the set of racially constitutive cultural performances, norms, meanings,
social practices, or institutions were empty, then there would not be a salient
category capable of producing discrimination. There certainly would be a
group of people with certain physical traits (just like there is a group of
people with bunions or freckles), but there would not be a complex of social
meanings such that we could talk about groups being discriminated against
in the thick sense. Again, someone could reject the constructivist theory of
race and hold that it is a biological or genealogical fact. But such a view
simply leaves the proponent no way to distinguish the thick meaning of
discrimination—a morally problematic way of allocating benefits and
burdens—from mere choosing based on idiosyncratic tastes or random
meanness.
We often lose sight of the practices and meanings that constitute the
very categories of race because one of the properties of this social category
is to appear as a natural fact about bodies instead of the effect of persistent
social stratification and meaning-making. 150 But the categories of
WHITENESS or BLACKNESS are only available as a basis for perceiving and
149

In what sense, for example, would one say that “pink” is a facially gender-neutral criterion,
especially if we are undertaking that analysis for purposes of asking if a state early-childhooddevelopment program only open to children that had never been dressed in pink discriminates on the basis
of sex? I can only see that claim being defended from the premise that gender is a category that is
constituted by genetic and biological facts.
150 That is, if one accepts the constructivist position on race that social practices constitute bodily
signifiers as salient and meaningful, absent these there would be no such social category, or it would have
a different content; “the visual salience of race comes less from any obvious physical differences and
more from how social practices train individuals to look differently on certain bodies.” OBASOGIE, supra
note 10, at 62.
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acting upon in a discriminatory manner because of the system of social
meanings and practices that bring about the very category; said another way,
properties and structure do not exist independently of each other.
Many theorists and commentators have argued in distinct fashions that
antidiscrimination law ought to be a project of cultural reconstruction. For
example, Robert Post has argued that antidiscrimination law should not be
thought of as obliterating salient differences of race or sex, but changing the
meanings; with respect to sex, Post urges an interpretation that “would not
require us to imagine a world of sexless individuals, but would instead
challenge us to explore the precise ways in which Title VII should alter the
norms by which sex is given social meaning.” 151 Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin
have characterized the antisubordination tradition as “[t]he moral insistence
that the low be raised up—that the forces of subordination be named,
accused, disestablished, and dissolved—is our story, our civil rights
tradition.” 152 Andrew Koppelman proposes that what he terms the
“antidiscrimination project” is necessarily an endeavor in which the state
actively undertakes the goal of cultural transformation that “seeks to
reconstruct social reality to eliminate or marginalize the shared meanings,
practices, and institutions that unjustifiably single out certain groups of
citizens for stigma and disadvantage.” 153
I concur with the content of those accounts in terms of a prescriptive
vision for antidiscrimination law. However, the conceptual points that I have
argued above have two important implications for antisubordination theory.
First, in order to defend a position that the Equal Protection Clause ought to
be understood as remedying group inequality, one needs a theory of what
constitutes GROUPNESS in the relevant respects. Only with this in hand can
we account for why we care about members of specific groups occupying
disadvantaged positions in the social hierarchy above and beyond caring
about the existence and shape of the hierarchy. Second, if one accepts the
constructivist account of racial groups, then transformation of the
constitutive meanings of the relevant groups is all antidiscrimination law
151 Post, supra note 30, at 17, 20 (“[A]ntidiscrimination law is itself a social practice, which regulates
other social practices . . . . It is because the meaning of categories like race, gender, and beauty have
become contested that we seek to use antidiscrimination law to reshape them in ways that reflect the
purposes of the law.”).
152 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 47, at 17. Reva Siegel’s “sociohistorical” perspective on
antidiscrimination law takes account of “preservation-through-transformation,” that is, how “[i]nequality
in the distribution of material and dignitary goods among groups is periodically contested, and when the
legitimacy of a particular distributive regime is successfully challenged, status-enforcing practices often
evolve in rule structure and rationale . . . .” Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How
“Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83
(2000).
153 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 8 (1996).

1226

113:1163 (2019)

Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking

could coherently be about. Therefore, antisubordination can make a more
forceful claim as the only sound interpretation of antidiscrimination norms
for those that reject a biological definition of race.
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